CHAPTER 2
The Nature of Governance in
Pakistan
RULES OF THE GAME
An essential component of the crisis that the Pakistani state
has endured through most of its forty four years has been
absence of “rules of the game” defining the relations among
the ruling classes, between different components of the power
structure and among the provinces that constitute the
federation of Pakist2n. An important reason why such “rules
of the game” did not emerge was the frequent experiments
with various constitutions and political structures. For
instance, the principles which were first enshrined in the 1956
Constitution, seeking a federal parliamentary set up were
reversed when the 1962 Constitution imposed a unitary,
presidential system of government. This, in turn, collapsed
under the 1968-69 mass movement directed against Field
Marshal Ayub Khan and the new 1973 Constitution, under
Zulfiqar All Bhutto, vested tremendous powers in the Prime
Minister as part of a federal, parliamentary structure.’ In what
was subsequently termed by General Zia-ul-Haq as a bid to
“balance” the powers of the President and the Prime Minister,
the 8th Amendment to the 1973 Constitution made the
Presidency into a powerful authority with the discretion to
dismiss the Prime Minister at will, dissolve the National
Assembly and appoint the Armed Forces chiefs.2
Pakistan, which started off as a federation of five
provinces, saw the imposition of One Unit in 1955, with
the provinces of Punjab, Sind, Baluchistan and NWFP
amalgamated in what was termed as West Pakistan.
In 1969, Pakistan’s second Martial Law Regime
was quick to undo the One Unit and the provinces were 26 Pakistan. Problems of Governance
then restored.
A similar confusion prevailed over the question of Islam
in the national polity. Two different strands defined what is an
abiding debate: the extent of Islamization of the state structure
as opposed to a loose delineation of the role of religion vis-a-vis
the constitutional and political structure prevailing in the
country. The Father of the Nation, Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad
Ali Jinnah, envisaged a Pakistan where religion would have a
role in individual and social life but not in the functioning of
state institutions. Z.A. Bhutto while amending the Constitution
to classify Qadianis as non- Muslims and later passing a law
banning alcohol for Muslims under pressure of the religious
lobby, nevertheless, held the view that while Pakistan’s social
ethos could be Islamic, religion need not be extended to all
aspects of political life by the state. Conversely, Pakistan’s third
Martial Law Regime led by General Zia ul-Haq made
Islamization the principal plank of polity and used Islam during
his eleven-year regime, as the basis of the ruling ideology.3
A
vocal and increasingly influential clergy became a major
constituency of the Zia regime. Interestingly, these different
perspectives were unable to bridge the dichotomy which
Pakistan has manifested in its successive election campaigns
(with the exception of the 1990 election): Islamic parties with
programmes of Islamization of the country in most cases end up
polling lesser votes than those generally termed as “secular” par
ties. For instance, both during the 1965 election campaign
which was contested by Miss Fatima Jinnah (the sister of the
Quaid-e-Azam), and the 1988 and 1990 election campaigns in
which Miss Benazir Bhutto was a major contestant, the issue of
women and their rights to contest and hold political office was
confined to a few critics from among the clergy, and it did not
elicit an emotive response among Pakistan’s highly politically
conscious electorate. For the greater part, the people of Pakistan
treated this virtually as a non-issue, preferring instead, to cast
their ballot on the basis of what the saw were the “real issues”.4
Probably the single most important expression of the
absence of the “rules of the game” in Pakistan’s polity resulted, in
large part owing to the recurrence of military intervention in Pakistan’s The Nature of Governance in Pakistan 27
political life. A total of three martial law regimes have ruled
Pakistan for twenty-four out of its forty-four years as a
sovereign state. Civil military relations have become such a
key index of a civil government’s stability that two of
Pakistan’s last three prime ministers lost their jobs because
they were unable to function effectively in the absence of an
operational balance between army and civil society.5
This
balance could not be attained owing to a number of reasons
including encroachment on each other’s turf, debate over the
defence budget or the desire to trim it, appointment of key
military personnel and a certain restiveness among the khaki
when in its view, the Mufti leadership had become “too big for
its boots’. Even in 1991, the single most important question, in
the minds of informed Pakistanis was whether the Chief of
Army Staff, General Mirza Aslam Beg, who had succeeded
General Zia-ul-Haq in the key slot of Chief of Army Staff and
remained virtually a king-maker during two important political
transitions in Pakistan, would be retired on schedule or not, He
himself had to signal publicly his intention to retire d not to
seek extension of his tenure as COAS, only then was he able
to set at rest the speculation in this regard.6
Compounding these problems pertaining to the
constitutional balance between such offices as the Prime Minister
and the President and among the provinces as well as civil
military relations, is the absence of strong non-governmental
institutions. Civil institutions such as the judiciary, the press and
intelligentsia have been weak and political parties with grassroots
organizations have been absent in Pakistan’s political life.
Ironically, it was in the eighties under a repressive military
regime, that a culture of resistance was able to develop,
indigenously and spontaneously, whose essence was a
commitment to democracy irrespective of the differences in
political orientation. For both civil and military authoritarian
governments, a favourite target of systematic assault has been
institutions of the judiciary, the press and the intelligentsia. For
instance, the regimes of Ayub Khan, Zulfiqar All Bhutto and
General Zia-ul-Haq, all tried, with varying degrees of success, to
snuff out the voice of dissent from within the judiciary through
selective purges or amendments of the Constitution that deprived 28 Pakistan: Problems of Governance
the judiciary of its teeth. The press was controlled through the
go monopoly over the issuance of licenses to publish and the
distribution of newsprint, whose control eventually be came an
important part of government leverage over the newspaper
industry. Such was the state of the media that by 1979, there
were only two major English language newspapers — The
Pakistan Times and Dawn — and two major Urdu language
newspapers — fang and Nawa-e-Waqt — in the country. 8
Universities and institutes of higher learning which
provide the institutional base for generating intellectual thinking
became the victims of an authoritarian regime whose worst
expression was the 1963 Press and Publication Ordinance which
enabled the incumbent government to deprive students of their
university degrees on political grounds, a legislation without
precedent in any civilized country. These assaults on the
intelligentsia were reinforced by the recurring purges of dissident
teachers and intellectuals from the universities and institutions of
higher learning, together with concerted efforts to permit violent
student groups working in collusion with the administration to
stifle dissent on campus.9
Given the politics of personalities that have been prevalent
in Pakistan, political parties have invariably revolved around
personalities rather than programmes and policies and, in fact, it is
the personality which invariably defines a party programme in
Pakistan. Additionally, given the feudal nature of Pakistani politics
the accent is on dynastic politics with scions of leading families
dominating political parties, and by extension, the seats in the
legislature of the country. Even Bhutto who won the 1970
elections on an issue-based programme, had, by the time of the
1977 elections, reversed himself politically preferring to patronize
the traditional political elites rather than giving strength to new
forces such as the urban middle and lower middle classes, who
had constituted the social base of the anti-Ayub struggle.10
The most damaging feature of the Pakistani
political system has been the failure to evolve a democratic
political culture based on political co-existence of
contending politicians and political parties and
tolerance of dissent, which constitute the sine qua nonThe Nature of Governance n Pakistan 29
of democracy. The absence of a democratic political culture
has tragically manifested itself on key occasions in Pakistan’s
politics when politicians, preferring to subordinate their larger
political interests to petty rivalries and infighting, have sought
the army’s intervention to oust a political rival rather than to
achieve an accommodation with their political opponent. This
was the case with Ayub Khan in 1969, when despite his
concessions to the political forces on the question of a federal
parliamentary structure, politicians like Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto
preferred to extend sup port to the group of ambitious army
officers who were keen to abort any political settlement
between Ayub Khan and the politicians so that they could
impose martial law and run the country themselves. Ironically,
the chickens came home to roost when Bhutto himself was
facing pressure from the political forces op posed to his
government in 1977. Despite having reached an
accommodation with his political opponents, some politicians
like Air Marshal Asghar Khan preferred the option of military
rule rather than the continuance of a weakened civil
government under Zulfiqar All Bhutto which had, by July
1977 agreed to hold fresh elections. Similarly, in April 1979,
General Zia-ul-Haq was able to order the hanging of Zulfiqar
All Bhutto with the tacit concurrence and, in some cases,
connivance of most of the major politicians of the country.11
THE AMERICAN CONNECTION
From the very beginning, since independence in 1947, the
United States has been perceived to be the most significant
foreign player in Pakistani politics and probably the most
vital element in the formulation of the country’s foreign and
defense policies. Pakistan’s pursuit of a policy of intimacy
with the United States was determined by a combination of
circumstances, including insecurity generated by fear and
distrust of a larger and stronger neighbor India — which in
the view of Pakistani policy makers had riot reconciled
itself to the existence of the country. The Indian attitude
was certainly the initial impulse that determined Pakistan’s
desire for a close military and political connection with 30 Pakistan: Problems of Governance
Washington. This, in turn, was reinforced by the political and
ideological proclivities of Pakistan’s decision makers whose
Westernized ethos was more compatible v the emerging world
view of Washington during the height of the Cold War.
This eagerness to seek an embrace with the United
States was made conducive on account of a number of
elements. There was, at one level, particularly after the death
of Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan in October 1951, a
general weakening of politicians and political forces in
Pakistan with a corresponding strengthening of the control of
the civil and military bureaucracy. The latter was less
responsive to popular aspirations and more at home with the
“free world” which promised it generous financial assistance
and supply of state-of-the-art military equipment.
Consequently the military tended to deepen its dependent
relationship with the US. In 1952, when Pakistan sent its first
Military Attache to Washington, whose mandate, as conveyed
to him by his superiors in Pakistan, was quite clear. Brigadier
Ghulam Jilani, the Military Attache, was told by his
Commander-in-Chief, General Avub Khan and the Defense
Secretary, Iskandar Mirza, that his main task was to procure
military equipment from the Pentagon. In the pursuit of this
task, he was told b his superiors, he need not take either the
Ambassador or Foreign Office into confidence because, as
they put it, “these civilians cannot be trusted with such
sensitive matters of national security”.13
In 1953, the visiting US Vice President, Richard Nixon,
se pleased after his meeting with General Ayub Khan. He wrote
in his memoirs that General Ayub Khan impressed the visiting
American leader as “one Pakistan leader who was more anticommunist
than anti-Indian”.14 In later years, it was this
dichotomy regarding the compatibility of common feelings on
anti-communism with the lack of correspondingly strong
concern of the US regarding Pakistan’s political and
security interests vis-a-vis India, that was to lay the basis of
the cleavage between Pakistan and the United Stares.
Ironically, it was the same General Ayub Khan who was
instrumental as President in pursuing a policy that brought about
this divergence of perceptions between the two countries.15The Nature of Governance in Pakistan 31
Interestingly, the Pakistan-American connection was
initiated at a time when relations with the other superpower —
the Soviet Union — had not really started deteriorating. Since the
partition of the sub-continent, the Soviets under Stalin had
viewed with suspicion both the newly emerging nations of Asia
— Pakistan and India. They essentially saw them as countries
which were “under the influence of British Imperialism”,
although this view was tinged with an initial empathy for the
Muslim State of Pakistan, given the fact that their local protege,
the Communist Party of India, had in 1942 supported the demand
of the Muslim League for self-determination of the Muslims of
the sub-continent. Stalin’s coolness to India was also
demonstrated by the fact that the first Indian Ambassador to the
Soviet Union, Mrs. Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit, the sister of the
Indian Prime Minister, Jawahar Lal Nehru, failed to get even a
personal audience with Stalin.16 It was apparently in pursuit of
such a policy, somewhat sympathetic to Pakistan, that the Soviet
Union took the initiative of extending an invitation to Prime
Minister Liaquat All Khan to visit the Soviet Union. Conversely,
the United States had extended an invitation to the Indian Prime
Minister to visit Washington. Liaquat Ali Khan initially accepted
the invitation to visit Moscow, but later on, he used it to fish for
an invitation from the United States and, as a consequence, his
visit to the Soviet Union never materialized.17 Liaquat All
Khan’s 1950 visit to the United States set the pace for the growth
of Pakistan-American relations and it was not long afterwards
that Pakistan was said to be afflicted with a disease called
‘PACTITIS’, which meant that Pakistan was willing and ready to
join virtually any Pact that the Americans were sponsoring in the
region to counter “communist expansionism”.18
The American connection was significant in reshaping
Pakistan politics in at least three respects. First, through the
supply of arms to the armed forces and in the context of the
1948 conflict, which had already taken place with India, the
American connection was able to establish the primacy of the
Pakistan Army in the Pakistani power structure. The result
was the emergence of General Ayub Khan, the Army
Commander-in-Chief, as virtually the “king-maker”
in Pakistani politics, a fact recognized and accepted 32 Pakistan Problems of Governance
by the Americans as confirmed in official American reports that
have been declassified by the State Department in l987.19 It was
perhaps no accident that when Governor-General Ghulam
Muhammad. after dismissing Prime Minister Khwaja Nazimuddin
in 1953 and dissolving the Constituent Assembly in 1954,
had in his Cabinet. Ayub Khan. As one of the key members
occupying the slot of Defence Minister.20 Second the American
connection established anti-communism as a vital element of
Pakistani state policy, both at home and abroad. Soon after
Pakistan’s entry into a military alliance with the United States in
1954, the Communist Pans’ of Pakistan was banned and its
members arrested or harassed. Third. the American connection
also laid the basis for creeping authoritarian rule in the country.
Soon after the conclusion of the Pakistan - United States military
linkage in 1954. for instance. the elected government of the
province of East Pakistan which had won the election under the
banner of “Jugtu Front”, including left wing elements. was
quickly dismissed after remaining in office for a few months and
the province placed under Governor’s Rule.21
The Soviet Union, till 1953, had supported the Pakistani
stand on the question of Kashmir that there should be a plebiscite
Occupied Kashmir under the United Nations auspices to deter
mine the rights and aspirations of the Kashmiri people.
Following the initiation of Pakistan’s American connection,
Moscow switched sides and started taking a strong pro-Indian
position on Kashmir. In fact, in 1955. Khrushchev and Bulganin,
endorsed the Afghan Government’s position on what was termed
as the “Pakhtoonistan question”.22 Another significant aspect of
the American connection was a change in Pakistan’s policy from
1956 to 1960 on the question of the admission of the People’s
Republic of China to the United Nations. Under American prod
ding, Pakistan started opposing China’s admission to the United
Nations during that period, although Pakistan had no bilateral
problems with its neighbour to the north. A high point in
Pakistan-American relations was the famous incident in 1960
when an American spy plane. U-2. which flew from the
American air base in Peshawar, was shot down over the Soviet
Union and its pilot. The Nature of Governance in Pakistan 33
Francis Gary Powers. was captured. This incident was
unfortunate for Pakistan not only because Pakistan had been
involved as a partisan in the Cold War between the Soviets
and the Americans, but also because this incident was an
infringement of Pakistan sovereignty as the plane had flown
from Peshawar without either prior information or
concurrence of the Government of Pakistan.
The American connection, also influenced decision
making on foreign policy at the highest levels of the Government
of Pakistan. For instance, in September 1954, when the
Americans were keen on constructing a new military alliance in
South-East Asia to be known as SEATO — South East Asia
Treaty Organization, a meeting of the regional Foreign Ministers
was called in Manila. Pakistan sent its nominee, Foreign Minister
Sir Muhammad Zafarullah Khan, with the express instructions
that he should tax sign on any agreement in Manila that
envisaged merely assisting a member in the event of “communist
aggression” . Pakistan’s primary fear; quite naturally, emanated
from possible aggression by India rather than the Soviets or the
Chinese. Amazingly, the Foreign Minister flouted the
instructions of his government by signing on the dotted line of
the draft prepared by the Americans as a result of which SEATO
came into existence with no concern for Pakistani sensitivities
regarding possible Indian aggression as its thrust was on
“communist aggression” alone. From Manila, Sir Zafarullah
Khan flew directly to Washington where he sent a long-winded
explanation to his government as to why he had signed, despite
orders to the contrary. The suspicion in Pakistan that Sir
Zafarullah Khan had gone along with the Americans because he
had been assured by the US Secretary of State, John Foster
Dulles, that as a quid pro quo he would be rewarded with the
membership of the prestigious International Court of Justice, was
reinforced when Sir Zafarullah Khan was later elected to this
position, which has a tenure of nine years. He won the election
by a margin of one vote, and interestingly, the Israeli delegate,
Abba Eban. was absent from the vote on that particular day in the
United Nations General Assembly. In February 1955, the Cabinet
ratified this decision of Sir Zafarullah Khan on SEATO member- 34 Pakistan: Problems of Governance
ship which he had taken in September 1954.23
On occasion, Pakistan’s intimacy with the United States
also coloured the political perceptions of the Pakistani leadership.
For instance, during his 1957 visit to the United States, Prime
Minister Hussain Shaheed Suhrawardy, was ebullient over the
results of his talks with President Eisenhower. His Personal
Secretary, Aftab Ahmad Khan, told the Pakistani Political
Counsellor at the Embassy in Washington, Agha Shahi, who was
later to be Foreign Minister, that “my boss has really performed a
miracle. He has managed to wrest a commitment from
Eisenhower that Kashmir will be ours”. Agha Shahi asked Aftab
Ahmad Khan “What will be the quid pro quo?” Replied
Suhrawardy’s aide: “In return, we will allow the Americans to
establish a military base at Badaber, near Peshawar”.24 The base
became operational in July, 1959.
There is also a view in Pakistan that Pakistan’s first
Martial Law, imposed by General Ayub Khan in October 1958,
had American blessings. There is sufficient circumstantial
evidence to support this view. Pakistan’s first free general
elections were scheduled for March, 1959 and it was expected
that the Muslim League under Khan Abdul Qayyum Khan would
emerge as the winner in the elections. A key plank of Khan
Abdul Qayyum Khan’s foreign policy programme was the
establishment of a confederation between Pakistan, Iran and
Afghanistan, a sort of nascent Muslim bloc in south west Asia
that would be independent of the power bloc created by the
respective superpowers.
In March, 1958, a high level Pakistani delegation
went to Washington for consultations with US officials under
the leader ship of Finance Minister Syed Amjad All and
included the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, General
Ayub Khan and Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force, Air
Marshal Asghar Khan. During this visit, the Army
Commander-in-Chief, General Ayub Khan, held separate
consultations with the Director of the CIA, Allen Dulles and
the Chairman. Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Maxwell Taylor.
In fact, Syed Amjad All recalls that one evening he got an
invitation over the telephone for dinner at the Pentagon hosted
by General Taylor. When he arrived at the dinner, he was The Nature of Governance in Pakistan 35
Surprised to see General Ayub Khan seated at the right of his
host, Maxwell Taylor, although he, Syed Amjad Ali, was the
leader of the delegation and by virtue of that position and
seniority, should have been placed according to protocol on the
hosts right side. To top it all, the dinner was capped by a speech
by General Taylor who pinned a medal at General Ayub Khan
from the United States Army. Later, Oat Ayub Khan sheepishly
told Syed Amjad All “I never knew General Taylor was going to
give me that medal”. 25 Six months after this Washington visit,
General Ayub Khan launched his military coup in the country,
which was the beginning of authoritarian rule and the first of
three Martial Laws, that ran Pakistan for twenty-four of its fortyfour
years as an independent state.
Soon after General Ay Khan became President of
Pakistan through his military coup. He was quick to sign a
Mutual Security Agreement with the United States in 1959.
And in 1961, General Ayub Khan proclaimed in an address to
the joint session of the American Congress, the “Pakistan
today is the most allied ally of the United States”. However,
these professions of solidarity wore thin very soon after when,
during 1962, even without bothering to consult their “most
allied ally” the US airlifted military equipment to India. It was
that single event which sparked off a reassessment among
policy markers including General Ayub Khan and his Foreign
Minister, Z.A. Bhutto, for the need of an opening to the
People’s Republic of China as a counterweight to India.26 In
November, 1963, when Foreign Minister Bhutto went to
Washington to represent Pakistan at the funeral of President
John Kennedy, the new occupant of the white House,
President Lyndon Johnson, told Bhutto what he thought of
Pakistan’s “growing flirtation” with China which was then a
major American obsession in Asia. Lyndon Johnson bluntly
told Bhutto; “I do not care what my daughter does with her
boy-friend behind my back, but I will be damned if she does
something right in front of my own eyes”.27 the message from
Washington was that the United States was not going to
tolerate Pakistan seeking a relationship with China at a time
when the Americans were expending all their energies in Asia
to “counter Chinese expansionism”. 36 Pakistan: Problems of Governance
When the September 1965 war erupted between India
and Pakistan on the day the Indians attacked across the
international border at Lahore on 6 September it was a
beaming American Ambassador who told the Pakistani
President with a combination of arrogance and satisfaction
that “the Indians have got you by the throat, Mr. President.,
haven’t they?”28 A week later, on 13 September 1965, the
British daily The Telegraph reported that just prior to the war,
the American had tried to topple the government of General
Ayub Khan through fomenting a coup via one of his close
associates, General Azam Khan, but, said the newspaper,
“General Azam Khan refused to play ball”. The divergence in
Pakistan-American perceptions was apparent when General
Ayub Khan traveled to Washington in December 1965
following the end of the war with India and he told Johnson
quite plainly “if I break with America, I will simply lose my
economy, but if I break with China, I may even lose the
country”. 29 In fact, Pakistan’s preference of China over the US
was guided by its national interest and was not simply a
question of spiting an enemy by befriending his enemy. The
culmination of this break on the part of General Ayub Khan
with his American friends was his 1967 autobiography, which
he appropriately titled Friends nor Masters.
By the time General Ayub Khan fell as a consequence of
the mass agitation led by Bhutto in February 1969, although the
level of intimacy between Islamabad and Washington had
attenuated, politically, the Americans retained an importance in the
eyes of influential Pakistanis. During the 1970 elections Bhutto
contested and won on two issues, namely, socioeconomic change
and popular anti-imperialism, including a hard line on India. After
winning the election he sent a message to the US through his
interview with Peter Hazlehurst of The Times (London) in
December 1970. He said, I have done more to block communism
in Pakistan than the millions of dollars which the Americans
poured in the region”. What he was saying was that the Americans
should be doing business with him since he had stolen the thunder
from the Left by using their programmes and slogans. 30
During the 1971 war, the Pakistani military regime badly
miscalculated when it tried to trade in its “IOUs” with America on The Nature of Governance in Pakistan 37
the question of the opening to China, which Islamabad had
expedited, through seeking US support in crushing the
insurgency in East Pakistan. Despite being the “most allied
ally” of the United States, Pakistan had the dubious distinction
of being the first country after World War I to be partitioned
with its boundaries altered as a consequence of civil war and
external intervention. Bhutto took office in the aftermath of
Pakistan’s defeat in the Bangladesh war with India. He too
was convinced of the need for an alliance with the US and it
was precisely for this reason that he revived the US sponsored
CENTO (Central Treaty Organization). During negotiations
conducted in Islamabad between the Opposition and the
Government to frame a constitution for the country by
consensus, it was none other than Sydney Sobers, the US
Charged Affaires, who was significant in pushing Pakistani
opposition politicians to cooperate with Bhutto.32 However,
Bhutto’s coziness with America proved to be short-lived
simply because issues came to the surface that brought about a
divergence of interests between Pakistan and the United
States. Pakistan decision to purchase a nuclear reprocessing
plant from France sparked off American concerns regarding
Pakistani de signs on the nuclear issue. Soon after this
agreement between Pakistan and France in March, 1976, the
US Secretary of State, Dr. Henry Kissinger, flew into Lahore
in August 1976 to hold talks with the Prime Minister on the
nuclear issue. He offered a simple deal to Bhutto: scrap the
agreement of the nuclear reprocessing plant with France and in
return, the Unites States would supply 110 A-7 planes to
Pakistan. 33 If Pakistan still refused to relent, then in the
memorable words of Henry Kissinger “we will make a
horrible example out of Pakistan”. From Lahore, Kissinger
flew directly to Paris to put pressure on the French
Government to renege on the nuclear issue. Two years later, in
September 1978 after a change of government both in Pakistan
and the United States, the US finally managed to “convince”
the government of President Giscard d’Estaing, to cancel the
nuclear processing agreement with Pakistan. 34
The importance that the United States attached to the nuclear
issue in its bilateral relations with Pakistan was evident from the 38 Pakistan: Problems of Governance
fact that soon after the July 1977 coup launched by General
Zia ul-Haq against Prime Minister Bhutto government the first
senior American visitor to Pakistan within the first month of
the coup, was none other than President Carter’s Science
Advisor, Dr. Joseph Nye, who came with the message to
Pakistan to cease its nuclear programme. The United States
also used the good offices of two Muslim countries who were
close friends of Pakistan, to pressurize Pakistan on the nuclear
issue. Pakistan was told by Iran and Saudi Arabia that the
Americans were “very unhappy” about the pursuit of the
nuclear programme and the message to Pakistan from both its
Islamic friends was to avoid earning the ire of the United
States on this issue. 35
Even with General Zia, although there was a close
relationship with the Americans, the nuclear factor was a
recurring irritant in bilateral relations and on two occasions in
1978 and 1987, the United States cut off aid to Pakistan because
of alleged Pakistani efforts on the nuclear front Suspicion
between General Zia and the Americans grew to such an extent,
(in spite of the collaboration on the Afghan issue), that by 1983,
General Zia actually suspected the Americans of maneuvering to
oust him from power. In September 1983, after the MRD
agitation had emerged as one of the most serious political threats
to his regime, the US Defence Secretary Casper Weinberger,
arrived in Islamabad for talks with General Zia-ul-Haq. En route
to Islamabad he talked to a group of journalists accompanying
him and when asked what would be the American attitude should
the agitation against General Zia-ul-Haq continue, Weinberger
responded in a manner that was bound to send ominous signals to
General Zia: “In that event, we will have to look for
alternatives”. Already, General Zia-ul-Haq had privately
confided to a Pakistani editor that “the Americans are behind this
agitation because Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi could not have begun it
on his own”. 36 By the time of General Zia’s mysterious air crash
in 1988, the gulf between Pakistan and the US had widened.
General La’s agenda on the nuclear issue, Afghanistan and Iran
and even on Central Asia, was viewed with suspicion by
Washington and he himself was perceived as a political liability. 37
However, the heyday of the American influence in Pakistan The Nature of Governance in Pakistan 39
had yet to come and now the United States worked hard to
achieve Pakistan’s transition from a pro-American dictatorship
to a pm-American democracy in a manner similar to what the
US had been able to achieve in the Philippines, South Korea
and Panama. After the 16 November 1988 elections in
Pakistan, Benazir Bhutto’s PPP emerged as the largest party in
the National Assembly.
In the midst of the complicated political transition in
Pakistan, two important American visitors arrived in Pakistan,
namely Assistant Secretary of Defence, Richard Armitage and
Assistant Secretary of State, Richard Murphy. It was under
their auspices that a “deal” was brokered between Benazir
Bhutto and President Ghulam Ishaq Khan. Some of this deal’s
key elements were:
— retention of President Ghulam Ishaq Khan;
— continuation of Foreign Minister, Sahibzath
Yaqub Khan; pursuit of an economic policy
devoted to free enterprise and withdrawal of
government controls, plus implementing the
agreement on the economy signed between
IMF and Pakistan on 15 November 1988, that
is, just a day before the elections;
— no interference in internal army matters such as
postings, transfers, promotions and retirements.
Initially, Benazir Bhutto was given two names — one
for Foreign Minister, which she accepted and the other for
Finance, which was Dr. Mahboob ul Haq, which she turned
down. The latter name she rejected on grounds that Dr. Haq
had opposed her father way back in May 1977 when during
the PNA agitation he had written a letter to The Washington
Post comparing her father with Ugandan military dictator,
Idi Amin. It was after this rejection of Dr. Haq as Finance
Minister that the Principal Secretary to the President Mr. V.A.
Jaffrey, who had extensive experience in economic matters as
a bureaucrat, received a telephone call from the American
Ambassador Robert Oakley, inviting him to a meal. The
luncheon was apparently devoted to economic matters, but the
very next thy Mr. Jaffrey was surprised to receive a call from 40 Pakistan: Problems of Governance
the office of Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto telling him that he
would be sworn in as Advisor to the Prime Minister on
Economic Affairs. When Mr. Jaffrey arrived for his swearing in.
Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto asked apparently in all innocence
1mm amongst those who had gathered for the ceremony, ‘ one of
you is Mr. Jaffrey”. Mr. Jaifrey promptly stood up so that the
Prime Minister could recognize the person whom she had just
nominated as her Advisor on Economic Affairs. 38
It was during the Benazir Bhutto government that the
American Ambassador was lapelled with the title of
“Viceroy” for his high profile interference in various facets
of Pakistani political life.39 He tried his hand at mediation
between the federal government and the opposition IJI
government in the Province of Punjab, between the Prime
Minister and the provincial government of Baluchistan led by
Akbar Bugti. Perhaps precisely for this reason when Prime
Minister Benazir Bhutto faced difficulties with President
Ghulain Ishaq Khan over the question of the retirement of
Admiral Iftikhar Ahmad Sirohey. Chairman Joint Chiefs of
Staff Committee, she was said to have personally telephoned
President Bush seeking his intervention and Support on this
issue.40 It was ironical that on 6 August 1990 when rumors of
an impending dissolution of the National Assembly and
dismissal of her government by President Ghulam Ishaq
Khan were afoot, Benazir Bhutto sent one of her top aides to
the American Embassy to check from Oakley” whether the
President had finally decided to dump her.41 It is, of course, a
remarkable coincidence that on both occasions, 29 May 1988
and 6 August 1990, when two different Presidents sacked
two different Prime Ministers by dissolving the National
Assembly, on both occasions before announcing these fateful
decisions, the last visitor to see them was the American
Ambassador. Arnold Raphael met General Zia on 29 May 1988
just an hour before be dismissed Junejo and Ambassador Robert
Oakley met with Mr. Ghulam Ishaq Khan about five hours
before he announced his decision.. Both the Ambassadors later
proclaimed their innocence in this regard and in fact, both were
heard complaining that they had not been taken into confidence
by the respective Presidents when they were going to The Nature of Governance in Pakistan 41
announce these decisions. It is thus no accident that Pakistan’s
political elite apparently seems convinced that the road to
Islamabad lies through Washington.42
POLITICAL CULTURE
A saving grace for the country and indeed the source of its
resilience, has been the political maturity of the masses and
their ability to spontaneously further the political process even
under circumstances of adversity when institutions of civil
society have been eroded. Such political maturity has been
demonstrated on several occasions, at key moments in
Pakistan’s political history. The tendency of the masses to act
spontaneously stem from various sources of motivation. These
include the people’s Islamic identity, their aspirations for
democracy and their strong anti- imperialistic sentiments. On
several occasions, the masses have demonstrated their feelings
in a manner, which leaves no doubt as to where they stand.
Seven such occasions in the last forty-four years are
noteworthy and bear testimony to the nation’s political
maturity. Take the case of the Pakistan Movement, the second
major upsurge of Muslim masses in the South Asian subcontinent
since the Khilafat movement after the First World
War. A party which had proclaimed its goal of a sovereign
state for the Muslims in India only in March 1940 was able to
attain its objective within seven years due to the indefatigable
efforts and single minded determination of one man, the
Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah. He was able to lead
the Muslim masses, notwithstanding opposition from
influential quarters including the British colonial
administration, which were keen to quit India leaving a legacy
of a unified India, Hindu chauvinists and Nationalist Muslims
who were keen to place the Muslim destiny in a united India
rather than seeking a separate sovereign state for them. But
what was significant was that the Muslims of India reposed
their faith in an individual who had, but for his religion and his
unwavering commitment to their cause, little in common with
them since he neither spoke their language nor followed a
lifestyle that was compatible with the overwhelming majority of 42 Pakistan: Problems of Governance
the teeming millions of the Muslim masses of South Asia. But
the basic fact was clear: Notwithstanding these dichotomies
the Muslim masses saw their salvation in the leadership of the
Quaid-e-Azam and the Muslim League since they were
convinced that there was a light at the end of the tunnel,
namely, Pakistan. 43
A similar demonstration of political maturity among
Pakistan’s masses was evident in 1956 when during the Suez
war the Government of Pakistan took a position which was at
variance with that of the overwhelming majority of the people
and political forces. In that situation, with the people corning
out on to the streets to agitate against the government while the
government was behaving in a subservient manner toward the
West, the popular impulse was guided both by Islamic affinity
with Egypt and anti-imperialistic sentiments that condemned
the aggression jointly carried out by Israel, France and Britain.44
The anti-Ayub movement demonstrated once again that
in the eyes of the people, tall claims of “stability, progress and
solidarity” did not wash since they were well aware of the fact
that the decade long dictatorship had been detrimental to not just
their own well-being but the country as well. Ayub Khan had
been a strong leader, probably Pakistan’s first internationally
acclaimed public figure since the Quaid-e-Azam and one whose
policy contributed to achieving an impressive growth rate of
GNP (although generating growing aid dependence and income
inequality), as well as an independent foreign policy. However,
after a decade, it was clear that his regime had become a
corrupt, self-serving dictatorship governed by the twin
instincts of self-preservation and self-perpetuation. Indeed,
Ayub Khan had presided over a crucial moment in Pakistan’s
history namely, the 1965 war with India which has been seen
by many as Pakistan’s finest hour when almost the entire
nation reposed unqualified confidence in his leadership with
the popular urge to resist aggression serving to unite among
the political forces, the masses and the military throughout the
conflict. In the popular view, the confidence which the people
had reposed in Ayub Khan’s leadership was in contrast to
what was generally perceived as a “betrayal” at Tashkent. It
was not just a removal of an autocrat through street agitation but The Nature of Governance in Pakistan 43
also the unravelling under popular pressure, of an entire
system of authoritarian control which had been knit together
by Ayub Khan after he had seized power through his coup of
l958. 45
A similar situation prevailed when, in the views of
many, Zulfiqar All Bhutto too had betrayed the popular trust
and the mandate bestowed upon him in the 1970 elections. A
combination of corruption and coercion was corroding the
regime of Zulfiqar All Bhutto and by 1977, the election
campaign and the resultant selective rigging provided an
opportunity to the right wing parties to launch a movement
against him. Significantly, his erstwhile supporters refrained
from countering the street agitation after they felt that his
performance in office did not match his earlier promises.46
A similar situation was faced by General Zia-ul-Haq
when he was confronted with a strong agitation in the province
of Sind under the banner of the Movement for Restoration of
Democracy (MRD). What was more interesting in the context
of the Zia regime was the ability of the people to make the fine
distinction between their own affinity with Islam and an Islamic
identity from General Zia’s cosmetic Islamization, whose
underlying purpose was to forge his own “Catholic marriage”
with power.47 An apt manifestation of the political maturity of
the masses were two events within a three-month span during
the regime of General Zia-ul-Haq. In December 1984, General
Zia-ul-Haq suddenly announced the holding of a referendum,
which, in his view, would be an ingenious way of linking his
political legitimacy with Islam. People were asked to respond
either in the affirmative or the negative to a single, simple
question on whether they wanted an “Islamic System”.
According to the election procedure if they would answer in the
affirmative (as they were expected to since, surely, the people
could not vote against an Islamic system!), General Zia-ulHaq
would be deemed to have been elected to a five year term
of office as President of Pakistan. Contrary to all official
expectations, particularly, General Zia’s own, the turnout in the
referendum, despite much canvassing, lobbying and persuasion
on the part of government functionaries, was a dismal 10-15 per
cent or so.48 General Zia was confident that a structure which 44 Pakistan: Problems of Governance
he had personally created and which he thought provided him
with a grassroots base could be mobilized to take people out to
vote during the referendum. Referring to these institutions as
“my army” General Zia told a referendum rally at one of the
cities during his campaign that this “army” included 37,000
elected councilors of local bodies, 175,000 Nazimeen-i-Zakat
and 180,000 Nazimeen-i-Sa1at.49 Conversely, in February
1985, when the same government of General Zia-ul-Haq
decided to hold general elections minus the political parties
who in fact boycotted these polls, 52 per cent of the
population turned out to vole despite the MRD call for a
boycott. This ability to distinguish between the farce of the
referendum and some semblance of representative rule offered
by the election, in which there was enthusiastic participation,
testifies to the level of political consciousness and maturity of
the masses.
Another event which exemplifies this level of popular
maturity are the results of the elections in 1988 and 1990, the
former probably the most vicious in Pakistan’s history with all
sorts of allegations leveled against Benazir Bhutto. However,
the people ignored her gender, ethnicity or sect, and voted her
into office because they saw her as a young, but untested
political leader wearing the mantle of her father, and who
deserved to be given a chance. But when she failed to deliver,
during her 20-month rule, the same electorate deserted and
ditched her since they felt she had nothing new to offer and
unlike Mrs. Indira Gandhi who was returned to her office,
Benazir Bhutto was neither filled with remorse nor willing to
atone for any of the mistakes and blunders committed by her
government).50 What was significant in the defeat of Benazir
Bhutto was not just the collapse of charismatic politics ‘but
the fact that it signified an important watershed in Pakistan’s
history when, for the first time, one democratic government
was replaced by another democratic government. The fairness
of these general elections has however been questioned by the
Pakistan People’s Party.
Finally, in terms of instances in P history in which the
maturity of the masses was demonstrated irrespective of the stand
of the political parties or of the government of the day, the most The Nature of Governance in Pakistan 45
recent manifestation of this maturity has been the Gulf War
in 1991. This even evoked an emotive resonance among
Pakistanis, quite unprecedented for a foreign policy issue
since the 1956 Suez War, when Pakistanis came out in the
streets organizing demonstrations in favour of Nasser of
Egypt against the aggression of France. Britain and Israel.
In the Gulf war as well, while the official stand of the
government of Pakistan was supportive of the multinational
forces in which it made a token contribution of 11,000
troops, the popular pulse read otherwise. The reason for
these popular sentiments in Pakistan in support of Saddam
Hussain and against the US can be analyzed on four counts.
First, in the popular perception, the issue was seen as that of
a small Muslim state defying the military might of a
superpower, a sort of Muslim David facing a Christian
Goliath. Second. Pakistanis saw double standards in the
attitude of the American led coalition which was prepared
to go to war to vacate Kuwait while similar and more
longstanding occupations in the region including Israel over
Palestine and India over Kashmir, were being ignored.
Third, the issue was seen as that of Saddam Hussain
becoming the first Arab and Muslim leader to launch a
direct attack on Israel in the last forty-two years. Finally,
such sentiments among Pakistanis were not surprising,
given their instinctive sympathies with the cause of
Muslims all over the world. After all, within a ten-year
period. Pakistanis resorted twice to demonstrations against
US diplomatic installations in Pakistan on account of
international Islamic issues. in November 1979 the Mecca
Mosque takeover prompted an attack on the American
Embassy in Islamabad and in March 1989, the publication
in the US of Salman Rushdie’s blasphemous book provoked
a similar reaction. Equally significantly. in the mindset of
most Pakistanis the actual American agenda was not the
liberation of Kuwait or Defence of Saudi Arabia but the
destruction of the military power of another Muslim country
and shifting the balance of power in the Middle East in
favour of Israel. 5146 Pakistan: Problems of Governance
CRIMINALIZATION OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS
One of the features of Pakistani society during the 1980s has
been the linkage of geo-political changes with internal unrest.
The nexus of drug money, Pakistan’s politics and the culture
of Kalashnikov developed into a triangle that was a classic
combination of internal and external factors.
Three specific events brought out this nexus. The first
was the Afghan war in which Pakistan served as a conduit for
weapons for the Afghan Mujahideen to the tune of US $1.2
billion in money from the United States alone over a decade
long period.. Addition ally, such assistance helped in creating
a trained cadre of some 200,000 Afghan Mujahideen, half of
them based in Pakistani territory, and the rest operating from
inside Afghanistan. Some of the Afghan Mujahideen leaders
were equally active participants in the drug trade as a means of
financial support.
The second aspect has been the unrest in the province
of Sind, particularly after the hanging of Zulflqar Ali Bhutto
and the suppression of the PPP with the result that in 1983 a
sense of deprivation and alienation made for an explosive mix.
In Sind, more than any other province of Pakistan, dacoits and
politicians who had been historically linked together, became
meshed into a process which was the glorification of crime as
a political act, a sort of revolt against the iniquitous status quo.
Inside the country, during the 1983 MRD agitation in Sind, the
targets of popular wrath were not the ethnic non-Sindhi
community which was not harmed at all, rather the focus was
on all symbols of state power such as police stations,
government build in banks or prisons. Prominent dacoits like
Mohib Sheedi, who were killed in an encounter with police,
were often glorified and acclaimed in Sind popular folklore.
This was largely so because the very act of committing a
crime by violating the law of the land, was perceived at the
popular level, as an act of defiance, h an action that was to be
lauded.
In parts of interior Sind, there have also been unconfirmed
reports that the educated unemployed are joining the ranks of The Nature of Governance in Pakistan 47
dacoits who offer them monetary compensation and protection
in return for “services” rendered. The result is that today a thin
line divides crime from politics, a gap that is likely to be
bridged further by the gradual collapse of the state machinery
in the interior of Sind.
The third aspect of this process. again an offshoot of an
external event like the revolution in neighbouring Iran, has been
the induction of dissidents, refugees, political activists and even
smugglers from Iran, many of whom were accused of criminal
acts in their home country. In 1987, for instance, two separate
instances bear testimony to these linkages of external factors with
the internal unrest in parts of Pakistan. Earlier that year, a
dissident Baluch Sirdar from the Iranian province Sistan
Baluchistan was killed in an encounter with the Iranian border
police. He had been living in exile in Pakistan and was wanted
by the government under various violations of the law there. In
July 1987, an office of the Iranian opposition group, the
Mujahidin-e-Khalq, in Karachi was attacked by a group of
Revolutionary guards who had apparently been sent on a mission
from Iran. There was an explosion, followed by a gun battle
when these Iranian dissidents, based in a Karachi residential area,
were attacked by Iranian Revolutionary guards. Given the
proximity of Iran-Pakistan ties, the Government of Pakistan
chose not to make this issue into a diplomatic tow between the
two countries and it was quietly hushed up and the 13
Revolutionary guards were returned to their country without any
charges being pressed against them.54
Karachi is said to be one of the major exit points for
Iranian refugees including political dissidents fleeing their
country since the revolution whose number is reckoned to be
in the vicinity of 10,000. In June 1991, during joint border
talks between senior officials of the province of Baluchistan
in Pakistan and Sistan Baluchistan in Iran which were held in
the Iranian city of Zahidan, Pakistan, for the first time,
agreed to the Iranian request to extradite those Iranian
nationals from Pakistan to Iran who in the view of Tehran
were wanted for crimes in their country. This was largely
viewed as a measure from Pakistan to appease Iranian
sensitivities as well as curbing the activities of those Iranian 48 Pakistan: Problems of Governance
refugees in Pakistan who opposed the revolutionary regime in
Tehran. Fear of extradition, it was felt, would be conducive to
containing the activities of these Iranian dissidents in Pakistan.
As far as drug barons go, Pakistan is said to be one of the
major points of export of heroin and other drugs into Europe
and North America with the Golden Crescent (Pakistan,
Afghanistan and Iran) replacing or even matching the Golden
Triangle ( land, Burma and Laos) in the export of drugs. So far
the evidence of linking drug money with politics has been
empirically difficult to find, although in a much publicized
case during the tenure of Benazir Bhutto in 1989, a prominent
drug baron, Haji Iqbal Beg, whose name was mentioned in a
BBC television documentary, confessed to supporting
prominent politicians of the PPP and UI during the election
campaign, a statement that was not contradicted by any of the
politicians and according to The Herald, Haji lqbal Beg’s
contacts with the government were secured through the good
offices of a politician of the PPP whom he had financially
supported during the elections, namely, the then Speaker of
the National Assembly, Malik Miraj Khalid.
During the 1990 elections, one of the eight members of
the National Assembly elected from the Federally
Administrated Tribal Area (FATA), was said to be a drug
smuggler, although he was sitting in the National Assembly.
There have also been allegations against officials of the
provincial government in the frontier province, although these
remain unsubstantiated. During the tenure of Prime Minister
Junejo, Governor of the Frontier Province, Abdul Ghafoor
Hon. had to resign from his office when his son was arrested
in the United States on charges of drug smug glint
Although the formal influence of criminals and drug
smugglers on Pakistan politicians is less apparent at an
informal level, with the decline of moral values and the
emergence of a crude materialist political culture, the source
of funds has become less of an issue than it should have
been. The result is an informal nexus where access to big
money helps in purchasing political influences and even
respectability in society. A key element is the lack of
information of the law, since to date no prominent drug The Nature of Governance in Pakistan 49
smuggler has ever been convicted in a Pakistani court of law,
although since 1989 three drug smugglers have been
extradited to the US under American pressure and two have
already been convicted in American court of law. The
establishment of a separate Ministry of Narcotics Control has
not helped to rectify this abysmal state of affairs in a country
where drug money is now managing to permeate through
different layers of society and politics.
THE EMERGING STATE
As the turbulent decade of the eighties drew to a close,
Pakistan’s politics were undergoing changes and shifts of a
qualitatively new character. In fact, the process of change that
began in the eighties in terms of its content and depth was
similar to the profound transformations in the 1940s and
1960s. It has almost taken the shape of a generational political
cycle of turnover for the inhabitants of this part of the world.
The 1940s galvanized the Muslim masses to seek a separate
state in South Asia, and launched the Pakistan Movement
which eventually changed the political map of the
subcontinent. Central to the politics of that period for the
Muslims was the question of an Islamic identity and assertion
of Muslim nationalism.
Some two decades later, when Pakistan’s fist military
regime had brought forth industrial progress in the country
which spawned income inequalities and the creation of an
embryonic proletariat, new forces were unleashed which
sought radical change through economic salvation. The Bhutto
Phenomenon was a product of such a milieu and it shattered
the assumptions of the earlier phase of politics which were
based on palace intrigues by cliques of vested interests rather
than the Bhutto-type mass politics.55
During the country’s longest Martial Law,
qualitative changes took place in national politics. Turmoil
in the region plus polarization following the ouster of the
Bhutto regime coupled with social phenomena more
general to the South Asian region such as increased
urban affluence and regionalization of politics. These, 50 Pakistan: Problems of Governance
in turn, resulted in new realities in Pakistan’s politics. The
electorate of Pakistan underwent a change in the last twenty
years and so did the issues. Charisma and dynastic politics
were unable to substitute for a stand on issues vital for a
politically conscious electorate. It is important to understand
that the coalition of various forces that brought the PPP to
power in 1970 and which was based on an alliance of the
urban poor in Punjab, rural poor in Sind plus the rural poor
and urban middle class of central Punjab had, by the late
eighties, ceased to exist. It was replaced by a broad, ill-defined
ideology identifying democracy with resisting domination of
the majority province over the smaller provinces and at a
national level, to a popular anti-imperialism, which ex pressed
itself in an antipathy to overriding dependence on external
factors, particularly the United States.
During this period, Pakistan saw several processes at
work which were running concurrently. There was the process
of fragmentation of political parties, one expression of which
has been the lack of consistency and abiding loyalties and a
remarkable ability to quickly switch parties without batting an
eyelid. It is thus not surprising that the credibility of the
already weak political institutions including political parties
has been eroded. At the same time, a parallel politics of sorts
developed, marked not by the usual “government versus
opposition” but consistent support for issues that appealed to
various constituencies. The Left-Right polarization which was
an important feature of politics during the 1970 elections was
now absent with both the Left and Right lacking credibility.
The affluence that came to Pakistan in the wake of the
“Dubai factor” generated greater self-confidence and more
initiative among the people. This affluence plus opportunities to
travel abroad and to make money also raised popular
aspirations for a representative government. After all, in a 15-
year period from 1973-1988, approximately US $ 22 billion
flowed into Pakistan as a result of remittances by overseas
Pakistanis.56 Cumulatively, over a period of time, this resulted
in a more positive national self-image for Pakistan and its
people.
A related fact was that Pakistanis as a whole, (the people as The Nature of Governance in Pakistan 51
well as the Establishment), have become more secure about
the state of Pakistan and despite the narrow social base of the
existing order, politically it is able to let “a hundred flowers
bloom.” There is more openness and a greater willingness to
tolerate widely differing elements within the political
spectrum ranging from SBPF, the MQM, the TNFJ and the
ASS to the Communist Party. A reflection of the changing
times is that such national figures as Faiz Ahmed Faiz and
Abdul Ghaffar Khan were honored, though belatedly, by the
Establishment ‘fl state’s capacity for tolerance has certainly
grown, particularly with reference to dissent from the
officially certified truth. And the dynamism of the people of
Pakistan is being channelized in different directions despite
institutional decay. Basically, these changes also reflect a
process that is sweeping across the entire region, namely that
of the unraveling of the post-World War Ii status quo which
was so assiduously nurtured by the victorious powers of the
war. in certain countries, as in Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan, it
has come at a lightning pace and in others including Pakistan
and India its pace has been somewhat slower.
Given this altered geo-political and national
environment of the eighties, political forces in Pakistan,
particularly the MRD, failed to keep pace with such changes.
These political forces were unable to grasp and adjust to the
“new realities” in Pakistan’s politics. Three basic “new
realities” are noteworthy. First, the emergence of the Aimed
Forces as a political factor willing, ready and able to play a role
in national life commensurate with its self- image of being the
most important component of the power structure. A “defender
of the faith” role for the Armed Forces is a significant aspect of
this framework? Secondly, it should have been clear to the
political forces that after 4 April 1979 the Armed Forces would
not be amenable to a total transfer of power to the civilian
politicians. At best, it could be power sharing and that too on
“ground rules” which the Armed Forces would set. Finally, the
political forces overplayed the importance of the “triple
alliance” between the Army, Afghanistan and America.
Basically, this alliance was tactical in nature and some of the
political forces, particularly the PPP, made the mistake of playing 52 Pakistan: Problems of Governance
on the same American wicket as the army had done. That the
nature of this alliance was tactical was proven by historical
precedents such as the fact that it was, after all, a staunchly
pro- American military regime that defied the United States on
its China policy twenty-five years ago. And it was an equally
staunchly pro-American military regime that resisted
American pressure on the nuclear programme. It was
therefore, not surprising to see the military trying to take the
initiative for a new relationship with Iran in the 1990s, and
opposing America during the 1991 Gulf War.
For the future, grasping “new realities”, the political
forces will have to struggle to widen the social base of the
political system, which is currently knit together by an
arrangement of the urban rich and the rural rich. The emergence
of a strong middle class, which is assertive as well as politically
conscious, has to be reflected in the political system in the
1990s, if it is to retain its representative character.
Three factors have been significant in the evolution of
Pakistan as a more confident and self-assured state as it
enters the last decade of the twentieth century. These factors
are Pakistan’s nuclear capability, the dilution of
provincialism through frequent recourse to the ballot-box, a
national consensus on democracy, and the emergence of a
nascent middle class capable of taking economic and
political initiative backed by greater affluence generated in
the last two decades. The nuclear capability is viewed in
Pakistan as having contributed to the creation of a new
balance in South Asia vis-a-vis India. It has also succeeded
in generating greater self-confidence in the Pakistan Army
and in the Pakistani state. At one level, this is a reflective
confidence arising from the fact that India is facing internal
crises and instability best illustrated by the emergence of four
Prime Ministers within an 18- month period, the uprising in
Occupied Kashmir and the separatist movement in East
Punjab and Assam. Additionally, in its first foray, outside its
borders since Bangladesh in 1971, the Indian army returned
badly bruised and battered from Sri Lanka. Conversely.
Pakistan felt that its nuclear and missile capability had
neutralized to a suitable extent, the awesome Indian superiority The Nature of Governance in Pakistan 53
over Pakistan in conventional weapons. Then the Indo-Soviet
political and military axis stood shattered with the
destabilization of the Soviet Union and the cessation of cold
war politics. The Indo-Soviet axis was seen as being central to
the defeat of Pakistan in 1971.
Pakistan also felt that it had gained “strategic depth” as
a consequence of the events in Afghanistan and the new
linkup with Iran. Additionally, for the first time in forty-three
years in their bilateral relations, India had sought and received
Pakistan’s assistance on a matter that it had all long
considered purely “an internal affair”, namely, the situation in
Occupied Kashmir. In December 1989, and March 1991,
Indian Prime Minister sought Pakistan’s assistance for the
release of Dr. Rabia Saeed and Dr. Naheeda Imtiaz
respectively, who were held hostage by Kashmiri freedom
fighters. Finally, while almost one-third of the Indian army
was engaged in quelling an insurgency in Punjab. Kashmir
and Assam, the roles seem to have reversed with the Pakistan
Army, probably for the first time being freed of the “extra bag
gage” of running the country under martial law or battling
internal unrest. Aggregative, for the first time since
Independence in 1947, Pakistanis felt that their country was in
a better shape as opposed to India in most respects —
politically, economically, psychologically and strategically.59
The elections in 1990 in Pakistan were also pointers to
political progress in the country. Apart from the fact, that there
was a change of government through the ballot box, a first for
Pakistan, the elected National Assembly had a sprinkling of
three former Prime Ministers and scions of three former
Presidents gracing the House. This was certainly an
improvement over Pakistan’s political past where Prime
Ministers have been hinged or hounded into oblivion. For
Pakistani politics, elections in 1990 can be viewed as a political
plus on at least three counts. First, with the absence of an
American role during the transfer of power in 1990, which was
unlike the case in 1988, the revival of the democratic process has
m meant the weakening of Pakistan’s sovereignty. The second
important aspect for Pakistan and democracy after the 1990
elections is that more of the political forces now have a stake in 54 Pakistan: Problems of Governance
the electoral process given that the two principal contestants
switched sides in government as a consequence of the
elections. In that significant respect, the elections contributed
more to national integration by bringing into the National
Assembly, diverse sections of the political forces having faith
in the system. The ballot box is now seen by most political
forces as the main mule of political change and attainment of
political power. Addition ally, the National Assembly is a
representative one since personalities including prominent
political dissidents, who had returned to Pakistan after many
years in exile in Kabul, now sit in the House.60
Finally, the 1990 elections helped to bury the politics
of “ghosts and graves” which had dominated much of the last
decade. Benazir Bhutto did not invoke the name of her late
father nor did Nawaz Sharif bank on Zia-uI-Haq during most
of the election campaign. Both preferred to concentrate their
energies on each other’s track record.
In this emerging Pakistani state, the changing role of
two important but somewhat controversial institutions is quite
note worthy: the judiciary, and the media.
1. The Judiciary
The judiciary has essentially been a political institution
whose role and decisions have had political fallout. The 1953
decision of Justice Munir, upholding the dissolution of the
Constituent Assembly, contributed more to the weakening of the
democratic process in Pakistan than any other single decision in
the first decade of the country’s independence. Again, the 1979
Supreme Court decision, (albeit a split one), to convict Zulflqar
All Bhutto in the famous murder trial added more to the sense of
alienation and deprivation amongst Sind his than any other event.
Pakistan’s judiciary is one of the three institutions
of Pakistan which are not just surviving but indeed have
strengthened during the last forty-three years. The first,
naturally. is the Army, and the other, surprisingly, given
the recurrent pressure to conform is the Media which is
today showing a zest for enquiry and a commitment to
democracy which was rare in the first three decades of an The Nature of Governance in Pakistan 55
independent Pakistan. Pakistan’s judiciary understandably has
had a mixed record, but, on the whole it has acquitted itself
well. The judiciary has up to the rule of law, defended civil
liberties and contributed to breaking political deadlocks,
thereby serving to push the political process forward.
Some of the judiciary’s characteristics are noteworthy:
— It is a political institution, whose mental make up is
conservative and whose ethos is steeped in the British
legal tradition. It has a general tendency to uphold the
status quo and not to “rock the boat”. Given this
makeup, it is inconceivable for brilliant but antiestablishment
lawyers to ever occupy a position in the
high benches of Pakistan’s judiciary.
— As a political institution more often than not, the
judiciary reflected “ground realities”, including mood
of the masses, preferences of the power structure and,
when the occasion so demanded, the judiciary’s own
sense of history.
— More than any other institution in Pakistan, the
judiciary has been asked to play a role, with recurring
frequency which is above and beyond the call of duty.
What is this role of the judiciary “above and beyond the
call of duty”? Often, the judiciary has been asked to adjudicate in
disputes amongst politicians (Wali Khan’s case in 1975 and the
imposition of limited Martial Law in 1977), between politicians
and bureaucrats (the 1953 Ghulam Muhammad dissolution
decision), politicians and the military (1959 Dosso, 1973 Asma
Jillani, 1977 Doctrine of Necessity, and 1988 Haji Saifullah) to set
“rules of the game” in politics, as it did in 1988 when it decided
against non-party polls. It has also been entrusted to try a former
Prime Minister, something which most other judiciaries in the
world have probably not encountered. Every enquiry into a major
event in Pakistan is held by a judge, every election is sought to
be supervised by the judiciary, and the judiciary is also being de
pended upon to preserve, protect and promote democracy.
Some of these are, of c integral to the basic functions of the
judiciary, others indicate a failure on the part of Pakistan’s politi- 56 Pakistan: Problems of Governance
cal leadership to devise “rules of the game” in national politics.
Even for the media. the first blow to the despised Press and
Publications Ordinance, came not from any government wt
professions of press freedom were not matched by its practices,
but it came from the judiciary when the Shariat Bench deal
some of its provisions “un-Islamic”, a decision which the Zia
regime challenged in court. The political importance of the
judiciary can be underlined by successive attempts on the part
of governments both military and civilian to tamper with its
independence. Zulfiqar Au Bhutto’s Fifth Amendment and Ziaul-Haq’s
Provisional Constitutional Order were both directed
against the judiciary and in December 1989, Ghulam Ishaq
Khan and Benazir Bhutto fought one of their toughest battles
over the is of appointing judges to the Supreme Court. For
civilian governments in Pakistan seeking to appoint their
nominee as Chief Justice is probably politically as significant as
the decision to have a nominee of their choice as Chief of the
Army Staff.
In popular perception, there is a criticism of the
judiciary and its role in certain situations. It is viewed as a
status quo institution, which does not go against an incumbent
government. The 1959 Supreme Court decision justifying
Martial Law, the 1972 Supreme Court decision declaring
Martial Law illegal and Yahya Khan an “usurper” (after he was
out of office), the 1977 Supreme Court decision on the
“Doctrine of Necessity”, and the 1988 Supreme Court ruling
against Zia’s dissolution of the National Assembly after his
death are cited as examples of the judiciary endorsing the
executive’s decisions. Circles close to Mr. Junejo, once
privately remarked that the only reason the former Prime
Minister did not go to court after his dismissal was his view that
the judiciary would not go against General Zia in his lifetime..”
In this context, there are aberrations like the May 1977 Lahore
High Court’s decision declaring Mr. Bhutto’s limited Martial
Law illegal the recent judgment of the Peshawar High Court
which restored the NWFP Provincial Assembly and the
Provincial Government. Even the 1979 Bhutto murder trial is so
controversial that it has not been even once cited as a precedent in
any subsequent criminal case. The popular perception viewed the The Nature of Governance in Pakistan 57
executive as exercising an overweening influence in this case.
Maulvi Mushtaq Hussain, who had served as a Chief Justice of
the Lahore High Court when the Bhutto trial began, was
treated in a most humiliating manner by the same generals
with whom he was so intimately associated till the hanging of
Mr. Bhutto. In 1980 after he was kicked “upstairs” to d
Supreme Court, Maulvi Mushtaq Hussain had shown his
reluctance to leave Lahore, but he was bluntly told that if he
did not go voluntarily he would be forced to do so.
During the 1984 Referendum, which is now generally
accepted as having being rigged, the “result” was being
doctored in the Joint Chief of Staff Headquarters and then
transmitted to the Chief Election Commissioner, a Judge of
the Supreme Court, who was duly announcing it on the official
electronic media. The credibility of the judiciary suffered m
this occasion. Matters are not helped when the Chief Justice of
the Supreme Court demeans himself in the quest for a job.
Justice Hamood-ur-Rehman willingly served as an Advisor
with General Zia on Constitutional Affairs with the rank and
status of Federal Minister and Justice S.A. Rehman was the
Chairman of the National Press Trust, a position normally
reserved for a Federal Secretary in Grade 22. And matters are
not of course helped by the unfortunate fact that two of
Pakistan’s most brilliant lawyers, Manzoor Qadir and A.K.
Brohi, in their time, were the best friends of military dictators,
rendering them expert legal advice on how best to scuttle the
democratic process. However, on the plus side, it is a matter of
record that unlike generals, bureaucrats and politicians, no
judge has been a parry to a military coup or dissolution of
parliament. And as compared to most of our politicians who
are now becoming corrupt as a group, the judiciary has been
relatively clean. And there are more examples of judges with
integrity and acting ac cording to their conscience than people
of equivalent rank in other institutions. Even today in the
political battle between Benazir Bhutto and Pakistan’s
Establishment, the outcome rests, in large measure, on the
judiciary. The crucial issue whether she is disqualified from
Pakistan politics will be taken by the judiciary, which in turn,
will have a significant political fallout. 58 Pakistan: Problems of Governance
For the future, in terms of the role of the judiciary, two
questions are pertinent. Can the judiciary alone act to protect,
preserve and promote democracy in Pakistan, despite the
continued failure of politicians on both sides of the political
divide to seek a modus vivendi amongst themselves? The issue
is not that of UI or PPP, since the politicians keep trading
places. The judiciary is too often being asked to perform a task
which is primarily that of politicians. And the other related
question for the future is whether the judiciary can remain
immune for an indefinite period from the Plot and Pajero
Culture” that has now come to permeate Pakistan’s society at
all levels with corruption institutionalized from top to bottom.
2. The Media
There are a number of inputs that influence various
decisions of any government. These include the government’s
priorities and programmes, the interests of those affected by such
decisions, the role of political and bureaucratic decision makers,
influence of foreign aid donors and, on occasion the media. in
this entire situation, the weakest role has been that of the media,
because its leverage is intangible, that is, in influencing opinion
via the printed words.
Governments in Pakistan are in most pan remote and
aloof from the m and they generally do not consider themselves
accountable to the people. In most case, the interests of
government are limited to preservation of the status quo and
self-perpetuation. Given this context, responsiveness to popular
needs or popular aspirations is limited. And if there is any
responsiveness to the media, indeed, it is selective. This process
is further hampered by the fact that, in large measure, the
government itself controls the electronic media and a
substantial chunk of the print media. As one perceptive
observer commenting on the government media has said
“government media is like a bikini, what it reveals is suggestive
and what it conceals is vital”. Or there is that famous saying
about newspapers in Pakistan by the prominent Bengali
politician, AK. Fazal-ul-Haq. He said: “Those who read
newspapers do not vote and those who vote, do not read the The Nature of Governance En Pakistan 59
newspapers”.
In Pakistan, four types of media axe relevant in this
discussion: electronic media, official print media, independent
print media and foreign, namely, Western media. The
electronic media comprising the radio and television are
entirely owned and controlled by the government. Since they
parrot the officially certified truth, they have little or no
credibility. The official print media also falls in the same
category since it is run by the National Press Trust, established
by Ayub Khan in 1964.
The impact that the media has on government
decision-making in Pakistan is, therefore, limited to the
independent print media or the Western media. Basically, this
is limited to editorial analyses, news stories and letters to the
Editor’s column. Since the media is seen as a useful vehicle
for propaganda and for promoting a positive picture so as to
give the “all is well” line, the government is keen that the
media hide the truth. The impact of the Western media on the
government is far more than that of its own independent print
media. That is why the government is always keen that
favorable quotes from the foreign journals should be
publicized. For example a Time magazine article about the
unusual influence on the government and politics by the ISI in
which Benazir Bhutto was shown finally to be gradually
getting the better of the notorious Intelligence outfit received
wide publicity.62
In recent years, there are a few instances of how
newspapers had an impact on government decision-making.
These include:
— The resignation of Ch. Anwar Aziz as Minister for
Local Government in the time of Junejo;
— The cancellation of the deal to buy frigates by the
Pakistan Navy at a cost of approximately US $ 1.2
billion;
— stories of drug barons living in hospitals under false
pre texts;
— the release of Rasul Bux Palejo;
— campaign against corruption under Benazir Bhutto.
— influencing opinion on foreign policy issues. 60 Pakistan: Problems of Governance
These are a few examples of how the media managed to have
an impact on government decision-making. There are other in
stances where, despite the media campaign, the government
remained unmoved. These include the decision to establish the
FECTO cement plant in Islamabad although it was a pollution
hazard through arbitrary alteration of the city’s Master Plan.
Then there are instances of how officially sponsored
campaigns had little impact on popular thinking, particularly
under authoritarian regimes. Take, for example, the family
planning campaign launched in the 1960s during the days of
Ayub Khan or the campaign to motivate a high voter turnout
during the 1984 Presidential Referendum. Both failed
miserably.
In examining trends in the Pakistani press in the last
few years, a couple of basic facts need to be kept in mind.
There is, at one level, a linkage between freedom of the press
and restoration of democracy. At another level, particularly
given the linkage between struggle for a free press and
struggle for democracy, the journalistic community is highly
political and has played an active role in the political process.
The trends in the Pakistani press need to be examined in three
broad contexts: the media under Martial Law, the media under
democracy and changes of various kinds in the media.
During Martial Law, the media worked under great
constraints and compulsions because of the Black Laws in
force (like the 1963 Press and Publication Ordinance) which
was reinforced by various provisions of Material Law that
went against freedom of expression. The media also
experienced repression of various kinds including closure of
newspapers, arrests of journalists, dismissal of journalists, and
the first such instance in Pakistan’s history, the lashing of
three journalists on political grounds. Forms of censorship
varied: till early 1982, there was pie-censor ship which meant
that all the subject matter that would be printed in newspapers
had to have prior clearance from official censors before it was
permitted to be published. This was followed by scholarship
under which newspapers themselves had to decide what could
be printed with newspaper managements themselves being
held accountable. This was complemented by the system of The Nature of Governance in Pakistan 61
“Press Advice”. In most cases, it was presumed to be binding
and penalties for not ‘accepting the advice” included a cessation
of government advertisement. However, journalists in the print
media and electronic media were among the first to promote the
culture of resistance, which included other segments of society
as well. This was in keeping with the historical role of Pakistani
journalism, or at least its substantial sections, to resist
authoritarian rule. This political role of journalists, and that too
in the opposition, further accentuated the adversarial
relationship between the government and the media.
During this period, some major contributions of the
media can be cited. First, the media kept the opposition
politicians politically alive by publishing news of their
activities and statements. This role was important since it gave
an impression of political activity and a political process
continuing although nothing extensive was happening on the
ground. During almost all briefings held for editor journalists
by General Zia, the question of holding elections and making
the press freer were raised. Second, with the emergence of
new newspapers, a transformation took place in terms of the
quality of journalists and journalism. The profession of
journalism became more respectable and people from an
affluent and educated background, particularly young men and
women, entered the profession voluntarily. Previously, the
profession of journalism was seen as a profession of “drop
outs”. This process also expedited a generational turnover in
the leadership positions in different newspapers both in the
editorial and management sections.
A number of developments have taken place since
1947 which are quite unprecedented in the media in Pakistan.
The Press and Publications Ordinance were already abolished
in October 1988 for which credit must be given to the postZia
interim government. What the government of Benazir
Bhutto did was to open up the electronic media to the
opposition point of view as well, reinstate some of the
journalists who were dismissed, remove the stringent
provisions of the NOC for travel abroad by journalists and
appoint known anti-establishment journalists to the position of
Editor in NPT’ newspapers. However, there remained areas of 62 Pakistan: Problems of Governance
misuse of official media by the Federal Government
particularly in the context of its differences with the Punjab
Provincial Government. These included negative television
coverage of the then Chief Minister Nawaz Sharif as well as
the use of the APP, the official news agency, to disseminate
patently false news. How ever, after a long time if not the first
time, the Ministry of Information was playing a low-key, noninterfering
role vis-a-vis the independent newspapers. That the
government of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif has largely
maintained this pattern reflects the fact that the media’s hardwon
liberties have come to stay. Another new element in the
media’s role is to function as a forum where political battles
are fought given Pakistan’s multiple and competing channels
of authority (e.g., ISI 1989 stories). There are a number of
positive trends at the institutional level in the Pakistani press.
These are the pluses of democracy but there is need to guard
against possible minuses. Apart from freedom of the press,
other pluses pertaining to the trends in the Pakistani press
include:
— the technological revolution in printing, particularly
the use of color and other high technology;
— readers are now able to exercise a choice in the
purchase of newspapers, both in terms of regions and
political views. something very healthy;
— working conditions for journalists have improved, with
greater choice to join/leave a newspaper as well as
higher emoluments. The fact that Pakistan has become
important internationally owing to the geopolitical
situation has generated tremendous interest in Pakistan
and coverage from Pakistan with the result that several
international media outlets are available to Pakistani
journalists.
Among some of the negative features in the
environment in which the press function, we can include:
— the inability of officialdom to cope with criticism since
they are used to functioning in the “all is well” mould;
— intolerance is increasing among the political forces and The Nature of Governance in Pakistan 63
there have been instances of attacks/pressures/threats
against practically every newspaper and in some cases
even journalists have been assaulted by various
political, religious or student groups;
— strong, independent editors are threatened by the
growing tendency of proprietors to act as Editors
which affects the internal independence and
professionalism of newspapers.
However, in one respect, there is no change and this
pertains to the fact that invariably despite having a larger
circulation, the Urdu press has less of an impact and influence
than the English press since the ruling elite is essentially
Western-educated and English-speaking.
NOTFS
1. The chequered nature of Pakistani political development is
assessed in a number of studies from various perspectives
including: Pakistan: The Long View, edited by Lawrence Ziring,
Ralph Braibanti and W. Howard Wriggings, Duke University
Press, USA, 1977, especially, its Chapter 9 ‘Political Leadership
and Institution-building under Jinnah, Ayub, and Bhutto’ by
Khalid Bin Sayeed; Pakistan: Failure in National Integration by
Rounaq Jahan, Columbia University Press, 1972; Friends not
Masters by Mohammad Ayub Khan, Oxford University Press,
1967; Political Parties in Pakistan 1947-1958 by M. Rafique
Afzal, National Commission on Historical and Cultural Research,
1976.
2. For an informed backgrounder on events leading up to the passage
of the Eighth Amendment and appraisal of its various clauses, see
three- pan series on it in The Daily News, by Dr. Safdar
Mahmood, “Eighth Amendment Beginning of the Controversy”,
14 May 1991, “Passage of the Eighth Amendment Bill”, 15 May
1991 and “A Blessing in Disguise?”, (16 May 1991); Professor
Khurshid Ahmad, Eighth Constitutional Amendment Bill: A
critical appraisal, Makiaba Mansoora, Lahore, 1985.
3. The Islamization debate in Pakistani politics has been aptly
summed up in Anwar Hussain Syed. Pakistan, Islam and National
Solidarity, Praeger Publishers, New York,1982,. Muhammad
Munir From Jinnah to Zia. Vanguard, 1980.
4. Prior to the passage of the Shariat Bill by the National Assembly, the 64 Pakistan: Problems of Governance
Islamic debate was revived in the Pakistani pr with a critique of
the clergy’s role from such sources as: Benazir Bhutto “Shariah
Bill and its Impact The News, May 16. 1991, Ghanie Eirabi “The
PM has no Mandate to put Clergy in Power”, The Muslim 15 May
1991; Israrul Haque four-pan series on “What is Fundamentalism?
The Muslim, 10.14,15.16 May 1991); For a different view:
Maulana Abdul Sattar Khan Niazi “Constitutional issues in the
light of Islamic Injunctions”, The Ms 8 May 1991.
5. For an mfonnc4 perspective on the debate in civil-military
relations see: Dr. Hasan Askari Rizvi The Military and Politics in
Pakistan 1947-86, Progressive Publishers, 1988; also Mushahid
Hussain “Civil military Relations under Civilian Regimes”, The
Frontier Post. 23 March 1990.
6. Mi affirmation of the Chief of Army Staff, General Mirza Aslam
Beg in this regard was published in the Nation, 15 May 1991.
Underlining that he would retire on schedule and categorically
stated that “there is no possibility of Martial Law”.
7. Mushahid Hussain Judiciary: A Political Profile”, The Frontier
Post, 5 October 1990; also “Human Rights and the Judiciary”.
The Nation, 22 March 1992.
8. Zamir Niazi, Press in Chains, Royal Book Company: Karachi,
1987.
9. Mushahid Hussain, “University Administration: Tackling Campus
Violence”, The Frontier Post, 23 August 1987.
10. Khalid Bin Sayeed, Pakistan’s Politics: Nature and Direction of
Change. Praeger Publishers: New York, 1980.
11. While there is little hard evidence to implicate politicians in
conniving with the Army, sufficient circumstantial evidence
exists, e.g., Tehrik-i-Istaqlal leader, Air Marshal Asghar Khan’s
letter to the Services Chiefs, May 1977, asking them to “Not to
obey an unconstitutional government”; even recent statements of
politicians like the Pir of Pagara “jang”, 13 May 1991 and Malik
Qasim who bluntly said “all Martial Laws have been imposed in
Pakistan with connivance of politicians”, The Frontier Post, 15
May 1991.
12. Studies on Pakistan’s foreign policy confirm this perception: SM.
Burke, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: A Historical Analysis, Oxford
University Press, 1975; G.W. Chaudhry, , India, Bangladesh and
Major Po Politics of a Divided Subcontinent, New York: The Free
Press, 1975; MS. Venkatramani. The American Role in Pakistan
1947-1958, Vanguard, 1984; Mushahid Hussain. Pakistan and the
Changing Regional Scenario. Progressive Publishers, 1988.
13. Major General Gilani himself stated this in his conversation with
Mushahid Hussain.
14. RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon. The Nature of Governance in Pakistan 65
15. Ayub Khan was so disillusioned with the United Stases that he
titled his memoirs Friends not Masters, Oxford University Press,
1967.
16. Mushahid Hassain “Pakistan-Soviet Relations 1947-1981” in
three parts, The Muslim. 13.14 and 16 August 1981: Syed Rifat
Hussain “Soviet Response to Pakistan Resolution”. The Frontier
Post. 17 May 199!, quotes the September 1942 Resolution of the
Communist Party of India (CPI) saying that “the CPI saying very
close to recognizing the legitimacy of the idea of Pakistan and the
two-nation theory”.
17. The various dimensions of this controversy regarding the Soviet
invitation to Liaquat Ali Khan are discussed, among others, in
Ayaz Naseem Pak-Soviet: Relations 1947-65. Progressive
Publishers, 1989.
18. Supra. Burke.
19. “Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957” Volume VIII
South Asia. US Government Printing Office. 1987. P. 436. refers
to Ayub Khan as “final arbiter of the destiny of Cabinets”.
20. Ayub Khan by his own admission, had prepared a master plan for a
Pakistani political system called “A Short Appreciation of Present
and Future Problems of Pakistan” way back on 4 October 1954:
Ayub Khan, op. cit.. p. 187; Khalid Bin Sayeed, op. cit. pp. 253-254.
21. The US announced military aid to Pakistan on 25 February 1954.
while elections were scheduled for 10 March 1954 and the timing,
according to Sidney Seltzberg article in Commentary (New York)
June 1954 was “to help Prime Minister Mohammad All’s Moslem
League in the elections in East Bengal” in Rafique Afzal. op. cit.. p.!
27; and after the Pakistan-US Military Aid Pact on 19 April 1954.
162 members of the East Pakistan Assembly condemned it while also
observing a province- wide protest. Afzal. op. cit pp. 131-132.
22. Mushahid Hussain. op. cit.. “Pak-Soviet Relations”.
23. Agha Hilaly. a Senior Pakistani Foreign Service Officer, who
accompanied Sir Zafarullah Khan to Manila and Syed Amjad Ali.
former Pakistan Ambassador to the US, confirmed this in
conversation with Mushahid Hussain.
24. Agha Shahi conversation with Mushahid Hussain.
25. Syed Amjad Ali conversation with Mushahid Hussain.
26. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, “A South Asian View” (Washington. DC:
Embassy of Pakistan, 1963) carries the text of the Bhutto
interview with Harrison Salisbury of The New York Tunes where
he likened Pakistan’s opening to China with US wartime
collaboration with the Soviet Union.
27. C.L Sulzberger, A Postscript with a Chinese Accent, Macmillan, 1974.
28. Air Marshal Asghar Khan, The First Round: India - Pakistan War
1965. Tabeer Publishing House: Lahore, 1979.
29. Tune. December 10.1965.
30. Peter Hazelhurst,.. The Tunes, December 1970. 66 Pakistan: Problems of Governance
31. Leo Rose & David Sisson. War and Secession: Pakistan. India and
the Emergence of Bangladesh. University of California Press. 1990.
32. Mian Anwar Ali. Intelligence Bureau Chief during the early
Bhutto period, in conversation with Mushahid Hussein.
33. Air Chief Zulfiqar Ali Khan, Chief of Air Staff wider Bhutto, confumed
this to Mushahid Hussain.
34. “Documents front Espionage Den” (Tehran 1982) volume on
Pakistan has specific details on US-France collusion which led to
France unilaterally abrogating the Nuclear Processing Agreement
with Pakistan.
35. Agha Shahi conversation with Mushahid Hussain.
36. Mushahid Hussain, “Defining attitude towards In The Nation, 28
April 1991.
37. “Shaheedul Islam Muhammad Zia ul Haq” foreword by Salem
Azzam, Indus Thames Publishers, 1990, carries articles by
General K.M. Arif which lists “five plausible reasons” for CIA
trying to eliminate Zia. P. 37.
38. V.A. Jaffrey conversation with Mushahid Hussain.
39. Mushahid Hussain, “Profiles of Washington’s Viceroys”, The
Nation.6 August 1989.
40. Lally Weymouth in the Washington Post, August 1989.
41. Mushahid Hussain, “The dissolution: An inside story”, The
Nation, 8 August 1990.
42. Mushahid Hussein, “May 29 mini coup: The Foreign Policy
dimension”, The Frontier Post, June 5, 1988.
43. For a full appreciation of the centrality of Quaid-e-Azam
Muhammad Au Jinnah’s role in the creation of Pakistan, see:
Stanley Wolpert Jinnah of Pakistan, Oxford University Press.
1984. especially his tribute to the Quaid in the Preface.
44. Mushahid Hussain, “Gulf War: Impact on Pakistan”, The Frontier
Posi.3 February 1991.
45. Khalid Bin Sayeed, “Pakistan Politics: Nature and Direction of
Change”, op. cit see Chapter on “Mass Urban Protests”.
46. Sayeed, op. cit.
47. Mushahid Hussain, Pakistan’s Politics: The Zia Years,
Progressive Publishers, 1990.
48 No empirically-collected data on turnout exists, only estimates:
This figure was cued by an Intelligence Chief in conversation
with Mushahid Hussain.
49. Mushahid Hussain, op. cit.. p. 156.
50. Benazir Bhutto even stated that “We were removed because we
were to competent” during a party dinner party as which Dr.
Akmal Hassan was present.
51. Mushahid Hussain, “Gulf Crisis: Impact on the Muslim World”.
Strategic Studies. Volume XIV. Autumn/Winter 1990-91
Numbers 1 and 2. The Nature of Governance in Pakistan 67
52. Ikramul Haq. Pakistan from hash to heroin (Alnoor Printer and
Publishers, 1991. Lahore) is probably the most comprehensive
survey of the contemporary drug scene in Pakistan: Kathy Evans,
“Bhutto tells Britain to act against drug uses”. The Guardian, 12
July 1989.
53. A document circulated in Islamabad on the eve of the 1983
upsurge in Sindh best expressed this deep sense of deprivation
among Sindhis. Titled “Statistical self-speaking facts on
employment of officers of Sindh (rural), i.e. Old Sindhis in
Federal Government 1977 – 1983” pointed, for instance, to only
one Sindhi posted out as Ambassador out of a total of 60
Ambassadors.
54. Lt. General Hamid Gul, the Director General, Inter Services
Intelligence, personally confirmed to Mushahid Hussain that the
government overlooked this episode given the larger interest of
Pakistan-Iran relations.
55 The Bhutto Phenomenon is discussed in detail in Anwar Hussain
Syed’s forthcoming book on the Bhutto years, to be published
simultaneously in US, Pakistan and India (Conversation of author
with Mushahid Hussain).
56. For implications of the Dubai factor on Pakistan’s economy, see:
Dr., Akmal Hussain Strategic Issues in Pakistan’s Economic
Policy, Progressive Publishers, 1988.
57. Mushahid Hussain. “Army’s Political Role” the Nation,
September, 16. 1990.
58. General Aslam Beg’s “Strategic Defiance”, theme was the thrust
of his 2 December 1990 and 28 January 1991 speeches, both of
which earned American ire.
59. Mushahid Hussain. 1990: The Year of India’s Decline”, The
Nation, 30 December 1990: An entire issue. January 1991 of
Globe, Karachi was devoted to this theme: Dr. Naveed Iqbal,
“The People of Pakistan are better off”, The Dawn, 19 April 1991.
60. Mushahid Hussain, “New National Assembly: A Political Profile”
The Frontier Post, 8 November 1990.
61. Conversation of a highly-placed Junejo confidante with Mushahid
Hussain.
62. Time, 27 March 1989: the article had several quotable quotes. For
instance, “The conductor may have died, but this orchestra plays
on” (The reference is to the death of Zia-ul-Haq but the continued
influence of ISI). Another, “We have no control over these people
(ISI). They are like a government unto themselves”. See also the
New York Times, 23 April 1989: The Nation, 26 April 1989:
Mushahid Hussain, Media under Benazir Bhutto”, Index on
Censorship, June 1989.
63. Mushahid Hussain, op. cit.
64. Mushahid Hussain, “New Threat to Press Freedom” The Nation,
31 December 1989.
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