THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF TRADE FACILITATION
AND REGIONAL CONNECTIVITY IN SOUTH ASIA
By
Akmal Hussain,
Distinguished Professor,
Beaconhouse National University
© 2009 by Akmal Hussain. All rights reserved. Quotations from the text, not to exceed one
paragraph, may be made without explicit permission, provided that full credit,
including © notice, is given to the source.
Paper Presented at the Third SAARC Business Leaders Conclave
22-23 November 2009,
Colombo
15 November 09 1
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF TRADE FACILITATION
AND REGIONAL CONNECTIVITY IN SOUTH ASIA
By
Akmal Hussain,
Distinguished Professor,
Beaconhouse National University
© 2009 by Akmal Hussain. All rights reserved. Quotations from the text, not to exceed one
paragraph, may be made without explicit permission, provided that full credit,
including © notice, is given to the source.
Introduction
This is the moment of reckoning in South Asia. A seismic change in the global economy
is shifting its centre of gravity, for the first time in three centuries, from the West to
Asia1
. The economic dynamism of South Asia and the innovativeness of its people can
enable them to play a leadership role in the global economy of this century. Yet at the
same time the region is threatened by religious extremism which can rupture the social
fabric and at the same time bring nuclear armed India and Pakistan into military conflict.
This religious extremism is fueled by persistent mass poverty in the region on the one
hand and by continued failure of states to institutionalize peace through economic and
political cooperation.
In my brief remarks I will focus on India and Pakistan whose continued tension is a major
constraint to regional economic cooperation and the associated immense gains from
regional trade and investment. I will first indicate the strategic dimension of the political
1
(i) This phenomenon was first identified and elaborated in a paper, Akmal Hussain, A
Vision for South Asia, presented before the Parliamentarians from South Asian countries at the
SAFMA Conference on Evolving a South Asian Fraternity, Bhurban, (May 16, 2005). Later
published in, Whither South Asia?, Imtiaz Alam (ed.), SAPANA: South Asian Studies, Volume I,
South Asian Policy Analysis Network, June 2006, Lahore, Chapter, Akmal Hussain: A Vision for
South Asia, pages 54 to 61.
(ii) Also see, Akmal Hussain, A Vision for South Asia, Indian Journal of Politics and
International Relations (IJPAIR), Vol.1, No.1, January-June 2008, Faculty of the School of
International Relations and Politics, Mahatma Gandhi University, Kerala, India. 2
economy of India and Pakistan within which both the constraints and the drivers of
regional trade and economic connectivity can be examined. In this context, I will identify
the role of free trade in achieving sustainable growth with equity on the one hand and
sustaining democratic structures, on the other. I will then indicate that inspite of recent
progress in tariff liberalization, intra SAARC trade continues to remain at an extremely
low level. In this regard I will mention some of the factors behind the slow
implementation of the SAFTA Agreement in Islamabad in 2004. Finally, I will conclude
with some of the specific measures that can be initiated to accelerate the process of trade
facilitation and economic connectivity in South Asia.
I. The Political Economy of India and Pakistan: The Strategic Dimension2
Let us start with the strategic dimension of the political economy of India and Pakistan
respectively, within which both the constraints to and the drivers of trade facilitation and
the peace process can be examined. India’s economic strength lies in the fact that having
established a heavy industrial base during the Nehru period in the 1950s, and a
reconfiguring of India’s policy framework in the 1990s to play a role in a globalized
economy, India’s economy has been launched on a high growth trajectory. With a
domestic technological change capability, international competitiveness in selected
cutting edge sectors like software and electronics and large capital inflows India has
achieved impressive GDP growth over the last two decades. Yet it has been
predominantly based on the home market with India’s exports as a percentage of world
exports, still less than 1 percent. Continued growth in the future will require acceleration
in export growth. To sustain GDP growth India will need to establish: (a) Markets for its
manufactured exports in South Asia and abroad. (b) An infrastructure for the supply of
oil, gas and electricity.
2
(i) For a more elaborate discussion of this issue, see, Akmal Hussain, Power Dynamics,
Institutional Instability and Economic Growth: The Case of Pakistan, The Asia Foundation,
(Mimeo), Islamabad, 14th April 2008.
(ii) Also see, Akmal Hussain, The Challenges and Drivers of Regionalism in South Asia: The
India Pakistan Peace Process, paper presented at the Asia-Pacific Research Centre, Stanford and
Observer Research Foundation of India, Conference on South Asian Visions of Regionalism, 19-
20 June 2008. 3
It is in this context of sustaining GDP growth that three strategic imperatives for India
become apparent: (i) Achieving a regionally integrated economy through an early
implementation of the Islamabad SAARC Summit Declaration on SAFTA (January
2004). (ii) Securing oil and gas pipelines and rail and road transportation routes from
Central Asia to India through Pakistan, and (iii) Overcoming political disputes with
Pakistan and other South Asian neighbours to establish a political framework of lasting
peace that would be integral to economic union.
Peace and economic cooperation with Pakistan is necessary for India not only to secure
its strategic economic interests but also to maintain its secular democratic polity. A high
growth, open economy framework for India today is inseparable from a liberal
democratic political structure. Therefore the existing social forces of Hindu nationalism,
intolerant of minorities will undermine India’s secular democratic structure as much as its
economic endeavour. Continued tension between India and Pakistan, will only fuel
extremist religious forces in both countries, to the detriment of their economy and polity.
Pakistan by contrast is faced with an economic crisis whereby it is unable to sustain high
GDP growth due to an aid dependent economic structure, inadequate export capability,
and recurrent balance of payments pressures. The persistent high levels of poverty, and
continued tension with India fuels the forces of religious extremism. Armed militant
groups have now emerged as rival powers to that of the state within its territorial domain,
thereby threatening the structure of the state as well as the fabric of society. Peace with
India can enable joint efforts in fighting the common enemy of terrorism. It will also
mean a substantially improved environment for the much needed foreign and domestic
investment. This could play an important role in accelerating and sustaining GDP growth
and poverty reduction in Pakistan.
It is clear that through peace, both India and Pakistan can reap economic benefits for their
people, and secure their respective democratic structures against the forces of religious
extremism. The national security of both countries is threatened not by the neighbour
across the border but internal social forces of intolerance, violence and poverty. A new
structure of peace would reduce for their respective nations the danger of cataclysmic 4
destruction from nuclear war, and also provide them economic and political stability.
Thus national security in both countries will be enhanced, by providing increased security
of life and livelihood to their respective nations.
II. Trade Facilitation as a Driver of Change
Trade and investment have historically been both the cause and consequence of
institutional change within the polity. So it can be for Pakistan, India and indeed South
Asia as a whole. The strategic objectives in this process are:
(a) To implement the Islamabad SAARC Declaration3
of 2004, with respect to
SAFTA (South Asian Free Trade Area). Pursuant to SAFTA, Pakistan and India ought to
follow the stipulated timelines of SAFTA implementation by reducing tariffs annually by
5 percent so as to achieve trade liberalization by 2013.
(b) Address the problem of non-tariff barriers, and establish a time-bound
implementation mechanism to identify and remove them by 2013.
(c) Establish the institutional framework for facilitating investment by South Asian
countries within the region.
(d) Ease travel restrictions within the region for the people of South Asian countries,
as an integral part of the process of trade facilitation and in particular, mutual economic
gains from the tourist trade.
Free trade and investment within South Asia and particularly between India and Pakistan
could be a driver of change in the institutional structure of the economy, polity and
society respectively, in the following ways:
(i) It would be a powerful economic stimulus.
3
Islamabad SAARC Declaration, January 2004. 5
(ii) It would create stakeholders for peace and the demilitarization of the polity in
Pakistan, which would strengthen and sustain the democratic structure in
Pakistan.
(iii) It would help build a tolerant and pluralistic democratic culture.
Let us briefly examine each of these dimensions of institutional change resulting from an
India-Pakistan peace settlement4
:
II.1 Free Trade and Sustainable Growth with Equity
An economic opening up with India would sharply accelerate GDP growth in Pakistan
through increased investment by Indian entrepreneurs. Moreover, import of relatively
cheaper capital and intermediate goods from India could reduce capital output ratios in
Pakistan and thereby generate higher GDP growth for given levels of investment. At the
same time import of food products during seasonal shortages could reduce food inflation
and thereby improve the distribution of real income in Pakistan. Easing of travel
restrictions would give a massive boost to Pakistan’s tourism, services, and retail sectors,
which could stimulate growth. At the same time it would increase employment
elasticities with respect to GDP growth (since the tourism sector is labour intensive), and
hence increase employment and improve income distribution. Thus free trade relations
with India would enable Pakistan to achieve a higher and more equitable GDP growth.
II.2 Free Trade and Civilian Supremacy
As free trade and investment bring substantial economic dividends to the middle and
lower middle classes a large constituency will be created in Pakistan to change the
existing perspective of Pakistan as a ‘National Security State’ which is presumed to be
‘threatened by India’ and hence requires the dominance of the military in the polity and
national policy. Shifting from the ideology of a National Security State to a democratic
perspective will make it possible to acknowledge that the security and welfare of citizens
4
Akmal Hussain, The Challenges and Drivers of Regionalism in South Asia: The India Pakistan
Peace Process, op.cit. 6
is primarily achieved through peace and development. This change in the national
perspective can be an important factor in strengthening and sustaining civilian supremacy
within the polity.
II.3 Free Trade and Democratic Culture
An important constraint to the building of a democratic polity and the principal threat to
state structures in South Asian countries, arises from internal conflicts such as: religious
extremism, ethnic, communal, and caste conflicts, and linguistic sub-nationalism.
Containing these conflicts requires the building of institutions for a pluralistic society. In
such a society not only diverse identities between individuals can coexist but at the same
time multiple identities can be maintained by each individual5
. Thus not only for
example, Muslims and Hindus should be able to live in peace but also a particular
individual can be a Muslim, a Balochi, a Karachite, a Pakistani, a South Asian and a
Commonwealth citizen at the same time.
II.4 Pluralistic Democracies: The Self and the Other
Underlying the cultural diversity in South Asia is the unity of shared wellsprings of
human civilization. It is a unity that is nurtured by its diversity. Thus national integrity is
strengthened not by the denial of multiple identities but by creating a democratic polity
within which they can blossom. Essential to the building of pluralistic democracies in
India and Pakistan respectively is the opening up of new economic and cultural spaces
within which the people of the two countries can encounter the ‘other’. In so doing
citizens of the two countries can experience the diversity and richness of the self6
.
In the past state sponsored mutual demonization has sustained inter-state conflict.
Demonization involves a narrowing of the mind and a constriction of the identity that
5
For a discussion on multiple identities, see, Amartya Sen, Identity and Violence: The Illusion of
Destiny, Allen Lane, London, 2006, pages 3 to 5.
6
Akmal Hussain, The Challenges and Drivers of Regionalism in South Asia: The India Pakistan
Peace Process, paper presented at the Asia-Pacific Research Centre, Stanford and Observer
Research Foundation of India, Conference on South Asian Visions of Regionalism, 19-20 June
2008. pages 10 and 11. 7
places the self and the other into a mutually exclusive and conflictual dichotomy.
Nurturing one’s richness requires a human relationship within which the other is
experienced as a vital fertilizing force in the growth of the self. Liberating the dynamic of
such a human contact, could be vital to the enrichment of identities and the building of
pluralistic democracies in Pakistan and India7
.
III. SAARC Trade and the Challenges to Facilitation
III.1 SAARC Trade as a percentage of World Trade
Inspite of a gradual increase in SAARC trade the total level of SAARC trade is still
abysmally low: SAARC trade as a percentage of trade of South Asian countries with the
rest of the world is still about 5 percent. However, for individual South Asian countries
there is considerable variation in this percentage: In the case of the low end group of
countries, the figure is 2.9 percent for India, 6.1 percent for Pakistan and 8.6 percent for
Bangladesh. For the mid range group of countries, SAARC trade as a percentage of trade
with the rest of the world is, 16.6 percent for the Maldives and 17.1 percent for Sri
Lanka. Finally in the high end group of countries, the figure is 42.8 percent for
Afghanistan and 63.7 percent for Nepal, since both these countries depend predominantly
on the SAARC region for both their exports and imports8
.
III.2 The Problem of Implementing the Free Trade Objective
From its inception, SAFTA has been dogged by the problem of implementing the
objective of free trade, with respect to the terms of the Agreement and also with respect
to the extension of deadlines for implementation of the agreed terms. The Agreement as it
now stands requires the “least developed countries” (Bangladesh, Bhutan, Maldives and
7
This sub-section is drawn from Akmal Hussain, Human Security, Economic Development and the
Peace Process, chapter in the book titled: Non-Traditional and Human Security in South Asia,
Collection of papers presented at an international seminar, jointly organized by the Institute of
Regional Studies and National Commission for Human Development in Islamabad on 31 October
– 1 November 2006, Institute of Regional Studies, Islamabad 2006, pages-233 to 234.
8
Deshal De Mel, Taking SAFTA Forward, Paper contributed to the SACEPS/IPS Seminar on
Strengthening Economic and Social Integration in South Asia (Mimeo), 30-31 May 2008,
Colombo. Table: Intra-SAARC Trade 2006, page 2. 8
Nepal) to achieve trade liberalization by 2016. For the non-LDCs (India, Pakistan and Sri
Lanka) the stipulated date for full trade liberalization is 2013. One of the institutional
constraints to trade liberalization is the failure to implement the GEP (Group of Eminent
Persons) of 1988, which proposed the elimination of the negative list by 20089
. However
the present Agreement allows countries to maintain extensive negative lists even after the
SAFTA Agreement is fully implemented by 2016. Although there is a maximum ceiling
on the number of items in the negative list, with the provision to review this number, yet
countries have no binding commitment to reduce the items on the negative list, in
contrast to the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement.
The magnitude of the negative lists as a constraint to free trade is indicated by the fact
that almost 53 percent of the trade amongst South Asian countries (in terms of value), has
been excluded from the tariff liberalization programme of SAFTA10.
There is a similar problem with non-tariff barriers (NTBs) in SAARC. It is now well
established that non-tariff barriers even in the absence of formal tariffs, can be a major
constraint to trade liberalization. In this regard the Group of Eminent Persons report had
proposed the elimination of non-tariff barriers within seven years of the signing of
SAFTA. Yet despite the fact that NTBs are quite high in South Asia, the SAFTA
Agreement has not adequately addressed this issue. The Agreement merely stipulates that
member countries “inform” the SAARC Secretariat of all “non-tariff and para-tariff
measures” which would be reviewed by the SAARC Committee of Experts and
recommendations made to reduce such trade restrictions. Yet there is no binding
commitment for countries within the terms of SAFTA to eliminate non-tariff barriers.
9
(i) Institute of Policy Studies of Sri Lanka, GEP Report – Progress To Date and the Way
Forward, South Asia Centre for Policy Studies, Kathmandu, May 2008.
(ii) Also, see Jayasekera, D, (2001), ‘Group of Eminent Persons (GEP) Report: Critical
Evaluation of Economic Aspects, in S. Kelegama (ed.) in Impediments to Regional Economic
Cooperation in South Asia, FES, Colombo.
10 Weerakoon, D. and J. Thennakoon, (2006), ‘SAFTA: Myth of Free Trade’, Economic and
Political Weekly, September 16, cited in Institute of Policy Studies of Sri Lanka, GEP Report –
Progress To Date and the Way Forward, South Asia Centre for Policy Studies (SACEPS),
Kathmandu, May 2008, page 5. 9
IV. A Seven-Point Action Agenda for Trade Facilitation
To some extent progress on regional economic cooperation in general and trade
facilitation in particular is constrained by the recent cessation of the Composite Dialogue
between Pakistan and India. If the people of South Asia are to reap the immense
economic benefits from trade and build sustainable structures of peace and democracy, it
is essential to resume the Composite Dialogue. Only such a resumption of the peace
process can accelerate its vital element of trade and economic connectivity in South Asia.
The peace process between Pakistan and India and thereby the future of their peoples,
should not to be allowed to be held hostage by terrorist groups who tend to cross national
boundaries precisely with the objective of undermining peace between these two
neighbours.
After the resumption of India Pakistan peace process, the SAARC endeavour requires
undertaking immediate action by all SAARC countries for the following seven
objectives:
1. Accelerated implementation of the SAFTA Agreement with an institutional
framework for monitoring tight timelines for implementation. In this regard the
stipulation of reaching 0 to 5 % tariffs must be implemented on a fast track basis.
Speed is of the essence because there is a danger of SAFTA losing relevance due
to competing bilateral trade agreements (BTAs) and regional trade agreements
(RTAs).
2. The Pakistan-India trade which is based on a specified positive list should be
replaced by a negative list and urgent measures undertaken by SAARC countries
to reduce the negative list to an absolute minimum, meeting the same standards as
ASEAN.
3. Constitute a SAARC Committee consisting of experts in the government as well
as the private sector, to identify the existing non-tariff barriers in South Asia and
recommend a fast track mechanism for removing these trade restrictive barriers.
The SAARC members in the next SAARC Summit ought to take up these
recommendations and undertake immediate country level action within a 10
specified time frame. The SAARC Committee can be made responsible for
monitoring the implementation and helping to overcome bottlenecks if and when
they arise.
4. At the moment, value added in services contributes about 40 percent to GDP in
South Asia. If trade liberalization is to be meaningful, immediate measures must
be undertaken to liberalize trade in services. Of particular importance in this
regard are: (i) Telecommunications, (ii) Road and Rail Transport, (iii) Aviation,
(iv) IT, (v) Medical Services, (vi) Education and Vocational Training.
5. Since travel facilitation is integral to trade facilitation, it is necessary to eliminate
visa restrictions for citizens of South Asian countries when traveling in the region.
6. Facilitate pro actively, an agreement between airlines of South Asian countries as
well as other international airlines to develop new flight connections linking the
capital cities of South Asian countries directly and on a daily basis. This should
be for both passengers and cargo.
7. (a) Initiate immediate time bound measures to achieve connectivity of the
electrical grids of the various South Asian countries to enable better utilization of
South Asian electricity generation capacity during seasonal fluctuations of
demand.
(b) Facilitate private sector collaboration in South Asian countries to invest in
hydro electric power generation that feeds into the integrated grid in order to ease
the problem of electricity shortages in some South Asian countries.
Conclusion
As a historic shift is occurring in the centre of gravity of the global economy from the
West to Asia, a unique window of opportunity has opened for the people of South
Asia to build a better future through regional economic cooperation. If we grasp this
moment, we can establish the basis of sustainable peace and democratic structures in
the countries of South Asia. 11
Inspite of recent progress the level of trade in South Asia is still lower than perhaps
any other regional grouping in the world: intra-SAARC trade is only 5 percent of
trade with the rest of the world. Therefore if SAARC is to become meaningful for its
people it is necessary to accelerate sharply the process of trade liberalization. This
requires rapid liberalization of not only tariffs but also non-tariff barriers through a
new implementation mechanism, within a short time frame.
Trade liberalization is an essential element in the dialectic of peace in South Asia. As
the peace process resumes between India and Pakistan a new action agenda for
economic cooperation needs to be undertaken. At the same time as the economic
benefits of trade and investment for the people of the region become manifest, new
stakeholders will emerge to deepen and sustain the structures of peace and
democracy. 12
References
1. Hussain, Akmal. 2006. Human Security, Economic Development and the
Peace Process, chapter in, Non-Traditional and Human Security in South
Asia, Collection of papers presented at an international seminar, jointly
organized by the Institute of Regional Studies and National Commission for
Human Development, 31 October – 1 November 2006, Islamabad.
2. Hussain, Akmal. 2008. A Vision for South Asia, Indian Journal of Politics and
International Relations (IJPAIR), Vol.1, No.1, January-June 2008, Faculty of
the School of International Relations and Politics, Mahatma Gandhi
University, Kerala, India.
3. Hussain, Akmal. 2008. Power Dynamics, Institutional Instability and
Economic Growth: The Case of Pakistan, The Asia Foundation, (Mimeo),
Islamabad.
4. Hussain, Akmal. 2008. The Challenges and Drivers of Regionalism in South
Asia: The India Pakistan Peace Process, paper presented at the Asia-Pacific
Research Centre, Stanford and Observer Research Foundation of India,
Conference on South Asian Visions of Regionalism, 19-20 June 2008.
5. Hussain, Akmal. June 2006. A Vision for South Asia, chapter in, Imtiaz Alam
(ed.), Whither South Asia?, SAPANA: South Asian Studies, Volume I, South
Asian Policy Analysis Network, Lahore.
6. Institute of Policy Studies of Sri Lanka, GEP Report – Progress To Date and
the Way Forward, South Asia Centre for Policy Studies, Kathmandu, May
2008.
7. Islamabad SAARC Declaration, January 2004.
8. Jayasekera, D. 2001. ‘Group of Eminent Persons (GEP) Report: Critical
Evaluation of Economic Aspects, in S. Kelegama (ed.) in Impediments to
Regional Economic Cooperation in South Asia, FES, Colombo.
9. Mel, Deshal De. 2006. Taking SAFTA Forward, Paper contributed to the
SACEPS/IPS Seminar on Strengthening Economic and Social Integration in
South Asia (Mimeo), 30-31 May 2008, Colombo.
10. Sen, Amartya. 2006. Identity and Violence: The Illusion of Destiny, Allen
Lane, London.
11. Weerakoon, D. and Thennakoon, J. 2006. ‘SAFTA: Myth of Free Trade’,
Economic and Political Weekly, September 16, cited in Institute of Policy
Studies of Sri Lanka, GEP Report – Progress To Date and the Way Forward,
South Asia Centre for Policy Studies (SACEPS), Kathmandu, May 2008.
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